Zimbabwe’s beneficiation and value addition agenda is the most ambitious industrial policy the country has undertaken in a generation. The 25 February 2026 ban on raw mineral exports, the 11 conditions for lithium producers, and the new mineral value chain framework approved by Cabinet all point in one direction: Zimbabwe will no longer export raw minerals. It will process them here.
By Rudairo Mapuranga
But there is a problem. A quiet problem. A problem that nobody is talking about at Cabinet briefings or investor conferences.
Beneficiation needs supply. Processing plants need spare parts. Concentrators need consumables. Refineries need maintenance. And right now, the supply chain that is supposed to support this industrial revolution is broken.
Let me take you through what I have learned, piece by piece.
The Price Gap Is a Barrier to Beneficiation
Let me start with a story.
A few weeks ago, I was talking to a miner who is building a processing plant. He showed me his budget. It was detailed. It was professional. It had line items for everything, except one thing.
I asked him about the equipment. Where was he buying it from? He looked at me like I had asked a silly question.
“China,” he said. “Where else?”
I asked him why not buy locally. He laughed.
“Let me give you an example. There is a piece of equipment that costs US$1,000 in China. The same equipment, from a local supplier here, costs US$3,800. Sometimes US$4,000. Same brand. Same product. Three to four times more expensive.”
He told me that even after shipping, import duties, and all the paperwork, it is still cheaper to bring it from China than to buy it from a supplier in Harare.
“I want to support local businesses. I really do. But I cannot pay four times the price. My shareholders would fire me. My investors would pull out. The math does not work.”
This is not a small problem. This is the problem.
The government wants miners to build processing plants. But building a plant requires equipment. And equipment in Zimbabwe costs three to four times more than it does in China. So miners import. And when miners import, local suppliers lose. When local suppliers lose, local manufacturing capacity shrinks. When local manufacturing capacity shrinks, the beneficiation agenda becomes dependent on foreign supply chains.
And a beneficiation agenda dependent on foreign supply chains is not sustainable. It is not industrialisation. It is a substitution.
Even Basic Consumables Are Hard to Find
The problem is not just about expensive equipment. It is about the absence of basic consumables that mines need every single day.
I visited another mine. This one was already operational. The maintenance manager walked me through his workshop. He pointed to a truck that was not moving.
“That truck has been sitting there for ten days,” he said, “waiting for a part.”
I asked him what part. He showed me. It was not complicated. It was not high-tech. It was a basic component that any mining operation needs.
“I called every supplier in Harare. Nothing. I called Bulawayo. Nothing. I called Gweru. Nothing. I ended up ordering from South Africa.”
Ten days waiting. Ten days of a truck idle. Ten days of lost production.
“Now imagine this happens to a lithium sulphate plant,” he said. “Imagine we are processing high-value material and a pump fails. If I cannot get a replacement fast, the whole operation stops. That is not just lost time. That is lost revenue. Lots of it.”
He told me that even for basic consumables—filters, belts, bearings—the local market is thin, sometimes nonexistent.
“We want to buy local. I am tired of importing everything. But local suppliers often do not have what we need. So we wait or we pay premium prices. Neither is good for business.”
Local Manufacturers Are Operating at 20 Per cent Capacity
Let me take you to a different place: a manufacturing company in Bulawayo.
The owner showed me around his factory. It was impressive. Rows of machines. Skilled workers. A quality control system that would impress any auditor.
But the machines were not running. Most of them were silent.
“We are operating at 20 per cent capacity,” he told me. “Our competitors in South Africa are at 100 per cent. Our competitors in China are at 100 per cent. We are at 20 per cent.”
I asked him why.
“Cheap imports,” he said. “Some of them are smuggled. Some are just cheap because they come from factories that produce ten times what we produce. Either way, we cannot compete on price. So we sit idle. Our machines sit idle. Our workers sit idle.”
He explained the arithmetic to me slowly, as if I were a child.
Low utilisation means higher per-unit costs. Higher per-unit costs mean higher prices. Higher prices mean no customers. No customers means low utilisation.
“It is a cycle,” he said. “And I do not know how to break it. We have the skills. We have the facilities. We want the business. But we cannot sell at a loss. And we cannot sell at a price that is three times higher than what the customer can get from China.”
Suppliers Are Not Engaging Miners
Here is the part that frustrates me the most, because this one is fixable. This one does not require new laws or foreign investment. It requires a conversation.
I sat down with a miner who has been in the industry for twenty years. He knows what he needs. He knows what he wants. He knows what he is willing to pay for.
“The suppliers do not ask us what we need,” he said. “They just show up with products and expect us to buy them.”
He gave me an example. A supplier brought in equipment that met Chinese standards, but his operation was not set up for those standards. The connections were different. The specifications were different. The whole system was incompatible.
“The equipment sat in a warehouse, unused. We paid for it because we had to. But we never used it.”
He shook his head.
“There is a mismatch. They sell what they have. They do not ask what we need. If they just came and talked to us—asked questions, understood our operations, listened to our problems—they would sell more. We would buy more. Everyone would win.”
I asked him if any supplier had ever come to visit his mine—not to sell something, but just to understand.
He thought for a moment.
“No,” he said. “Not once.”
Some Miners Have Found a Workaround
When the formal supply chain fails, miners create their own solutions.
I visited a community engineering company in one of the mining districts. It was started by a group of miners who got tired of waiting for spare parts.
“We could not get what we needed from the suppliers, so we decided to make it ourselves,” one of them told me.
They started small. A few tools. A few skilled workers. Word spread. Soon, other miners were coming to them for repairs, parts, and advice.
“We are not big. We cannot supply a whole processing plant. But for the small things—the things that break often, the things that stop production—we are faster than anyone. And we are cheaper than anyone.”
I asked him if they could scale up—if they could supply the big mines, processing plants, and refineries.
“We would love to. But we do not have the capital, the equipment, or the support. We are a workaround, not a solution.”
The Beneficiation Agenda Depends on Solving This
Let me connect the dots for you.
The government’s beneficiation strategy is built on a simple premise: process minerals here, capture value here, create jobs here.
But processing minerals here requires functional supply chains. A lithium sulphate plant cannot run without spare parts. A concentrator cannot operate without consumables. A refinery cannot function without maintenance services.
If every spare part, consumable, and maintenance service has to be imported from China or South Africa, then the beneficiation agenda becomes an import-dependent, foreign-currency-consuming exercise.
That is not industrialisation. That is substitution.
“We are building these beautiful plants,” one miner said to me, “but we are not building the ecosystem around them. We are not building the supply chain. We are not building the local capacity to keep them running. And that means they will always be dependent on someone else.”
There Are Signs of Progress
I do not want to be all doom and gloom. There are signs of progress—small signs, but signs.
The Zimbabwe Miners Federation has partnered with Dinson Iron and Steel Company to boost local machinery production.
“Gone are the days of importing products such as bow and hammer mills, which are made from steel,” ZMF president Henrietta Rushwaya said.
Local engineering firms like Value Engineering are also stepping up, providing machining, fabrication, and hydraulic support to mining operations across the country.
“We’re helping clients reduce costly downtime, which directly impacts production and revenue,” mechanical engineer Alfred Makuyana said.
These are small steps, but they are steps in the right direction.
What Needs to Happen Now
The disconnect between miners and suppliers is not insurmountable, but closing it requires action on three fronts.
For suppliers: Stop selling what you have. Start supplying what miners need. Visit the mines. Ask questions. Understand the operations. Price competitively. Recognise that the market is small but loyal. Miners will support local suppliers who offer fair prices and reliable service.
For miners: Where possible, support local engineering companies. Provide feedback to suppliers about what is needed. Recognise that local suppliers cannot compete on price if they are operating at 20 percent capacity while Chinese competitors operate at 100 percent.
For government: Support local manufacturing through policy. The DISCO partnership is a start, but more needs to be done. Enforce anti-smuggling laws to stop cheap imports from flooding the market. Provide incentives for local manufacturers to expand capacity. Recognise that the beneficiation agenda will fail if it is built on a broken supply chain.
I have been writing about Zimbabwe’s mining sector for a long time. I have seen policies come and go. I have seen strategies announced and abandoned. I have seen conferences full of promises and boardrooms empty of action.
But this beneficiation agenda feels different. It feels real. The ban is in place. The conditions are set. The plants are being built.
But none of it will matter if the supply chain is broken, because a lithium sulphate plant is just an expensive pile of metal if you cannot get a spare part when something breaks.
And something always breaks.
The path forward is not complicated. Suppliers need to engage miners. Miners need to support local suppliers. Government needs to level the playing field.
The alternative is a beneficiation agenda built on Chinese spare parts, South African consumables, and imported expertise. That is not the industrial revolution Zimbabwe is trying to build. It is the same extractive model, dressed up in new clothes.
The clock is ticking. The plants are being built. The ban is in place. The only missing piece is the supply chain to keep it all running.
The question is whether Zimbabwe will build it, or watch it be imported.
