Critical Analysis of the Mines and Minerals Bill 2025

After taking a deep insight into the gazetted Mines and Minerals Bill, I shall be writing, in series, the said analysis, bordering both on the policy perspective and clause-by-clause analysis.

i. To begin with, the amendment of the Bill has taken so much time and state financial resources without a tangible return for several years (value for money concept). It would be noble that the provisions of the Bill that are too contentious be set aside for further debate, while those that are progressive are retained and the amendments proceed. Some things that have been recycled in the series of Bills are gradually being overtaken by technological advancement, and no one is taking notice. There are key areas such as taxes and farmer–miner issues that cannot wait in abeyance for another five (5) years or so, waiting for an opportunity for a perfect Bill to come by.

ii. The second issue is the absence of a national mining policy. We will continue to be a reactionary nation instead of planning ahead and learning from other jurisdictions. A national policy belongs to the nation, and we determine what constitutes the mining policy, but to remain without a policy altogether is nothing but detrimental to the growth of the mining sector and the economy. The mining policy would give a general sense of certainty as it relates to investment, a clear integrated roadmap with other local administrative structures, and value addition and beneficiation strategy.

iii. Besides the proposed Cadastral system, the provisions of the Bill do not seem to cater for new innovations and the evolution of technology, for example, airborne exploration. There has to be a clear embracing of new technology and also applicable restrictions. Casting a blind eye while technology is advancing will only place us in a reactionary mode without any legal basis to enforce restrictions, compel the release of information, or impose penalties, because without a doubt there are some components of illegal airborne exploration happening around the globe. A balance between embracing and restricting airborne surveys must be clearly spelt out in the current Bill.

iv. There is a need for clarity as to the roles of the PMD and the Mining Cadastral Registrar. Lessons learnt from other jurisdictions show that the current PMD title is absorbed as the Cadastral Registrar, who works with the support of other technical personnel, including ICT. The Cadastral Registrar is the actual issuer of titles that fall under his or her jurisdiction and refers other applications to the relevant issuing authorities. It is not possible to have both the Cadastral Registrar and PMD. The Registrar does not have to be an ICT person, but purely an administrator with support staff. This person reports to the Secretary.

The system is automated on a first-come, first-served basis. If compliance requirements are met and, according to the computerised system, the ground is open to pegging and prospecting, the applicant should get the licence without any hassles. The computer will recommend issuance, and the Cadastral Registrar will sign and upload the certificate. There is no basis for having both PMD and Cadastral Registrar. It is also disastrous to suggest that the Secretary becomes the Cadastral Registrar. Inasmuch as the Secretary cannot be the PMD or a Mining Commissioner (as they were previously known), the Secretary cannot be the Cadastral Registrar.

The Cadastral system is the movement from the use of paperwork to uploading the said paperwork into soft-copy versions, creating a platform where all users can interface with the dashboard and track applications. The computerised system blocks ground not open to pegging and automatically rejects applications over ground that is already occupied. If it is a reservation, the computer will advise, and the Registrar, through his or her team, will refer the application to the relevant issuing authority. If a block is overdue for payment of levies or licence renewal, the dashboard will report this and an automated abandonment will be recorded after the prescribed grace period has lapsed.

There is nothing in the digitalisation process that requires the Secretary to become the Cadastral Registrar. Zimbabwe would be the first country with such a setup. Further, the post simply requires someone with administrative capabilities, not necessarily an ICT technical expert. The critical role ICT plays is to ensure that the system is effectively maintained and always operational, not to evaluate submitted documents, assess compliance, or sign off mining licences. Once coordinates of registered blocks, reserved areas, and special features such as rivers and game parks are entered into the system, there is no further role for ICT beyond system maintenance and monitoring.

v. As it stands, PMD is already issuing titles even under the present Bill, while the Secretary issues a certain class of Special Grants and plays a key oversight role, with powers to correct mistakes made by the PMD. This should continue under the computerised system. Currently, despite the PMD having powers to administer the Act, the Secretary remains the custodian of the Act, balancing administrative issues and liaising with the political executive arm, being the Minister’s office. The Secretary remains the Accounting Officer and has, for all these years, been accountable for the actions taken by officials, albeit under manual systems. The Cadastral Registrar remains a subordinate of the Secretary (for example, in the court system, neither the Chief Justice nor the Secretary for Justice is the Registrar, even after the introduction of IECMS). Role clarity should be considered more seriously than mere title designation.

The general expectation was that the proposed Bill would tackle some of the real issues fuelling mining disputes, beyond merely realigning sections.

vi. Issues around the resurrection of forfeited or old blocks by some registered prospectors (peggers) and individuals with financial muscle, with the assistance of some officials, remain problematic. There are several court cases against registered peggers who register blocks to unsuspecting prospective miners. These peggers either provide incorrect coordinates and later register the block in their own names or to third parties at a price. Some peggers demand exorbitant amounts outside agreed service payments; failure to comply may result in the pegger creating a mining dispute, either as a boundary issue or complete ownership issue, after resuscitating an ancient block.

vii. The proposed Bill, instead of repeating the same forfeiture terms provided in the current Act—which are clearly not working—should have introduced a practical solution. Unfortunately, when the claim holder goes to court, the onus is placed on the miner to prove forfeiture by supplying a forfeiture notice. This is often impossible because the notice is the property of the Ministry, placed on a notice board and removed only by the Ministry. It is also often impossible for the Ministry to release forfeiture notices, especially where there is connivance. Additionally, due to manual record-keeping, documents are misplaced over time, or locating them becomes too burdensome for officials.

This leaves the title holder with nothing to support the claim except a certificate or licence clearly endorsed as a “re-peg.” In court, the Ministry of Mines is not compelled to explain why the certificate is so endorsed. In most cases, the claim holder loses on technical grounds.

Proposal
Introduce automatic abandonment for failure by any registered miner to pay for inspection certificates, which form the basis of keeping licences current. This removes the obligation on the Ministry to issue forfeiture notices. It would also eliminate claims that blocks registered decades ago remain current without activity or ownership claims until profits emerge. Courts should require the Ministry to prove inspection fee payments and inspection reports for previous years and address compensation for new title holders who invested in good faith.

Mining should be considered a business at all production levels, and each miner must ensure their licence remains current. Failure to do so within the prescribed period should be deemed abandonment, and mining rights automatically cancelled. This position will be reinforced by the Cadastral system, which automatically flags non-compliance and opens blocks to pegging after grace periods lapse.

viii. It takes too long for the Ministry of Mines to conduct pre-registration and confirmation surveys due to lack of resources. This results in overlapping applications, especially in provinces where the Cadastral system is ineffective or electricity is unavailable, allowing later applications to overtake earlier ones.

Proposal
The Bill should provide for miners to make payments for travel costs. Officials are currently hesitant to accept fuel payments, yet the status quo renders the Ministry ineffective and leads to wasted time resolving disputes or attending court.

ix. Internal dispute resolution processes should have been addressed more extensively. Currently, appeals presided over by the Minister are limited to those under section 50 of the Act. Many disputes require review mechanisms. Ministerial intervention, supported by technical staff, can resolve disputes faster than prolonged court processes that often return matters to the Ministry. Courts rely heavily on PMD submissions, which may not always be accurate. An internal review process would improve reliability and reduce court congestion.

Proposal

1. Formally establish a dispute hearing committee in the Bill to advise the Minister.
2. Properly constitute the committee with competent persons, including outsourced expertise if necessary.
3. Provide for changing technical teams during field investigations, including private surveyors paid by interested parties, subject to Ministry notification.
4. Create a register of approved survey companies as alternatives to registered peggers.
5. Remove section 345(1) of the current Act, which allows parties to deny provincial court jurisdiction without cause.
6. Re-evaluate the practice of the same PMD presiding over matters after issuing licences, except for boundary disputes. Establish a circuit court system with appropriate technical expertise.

x. Another cause of disputes is abuse of power by current or former employees with historical company information, who purport to represent companies during PMD hearings and obtain favourable orders after resuscitating old claims without current inspection certificates. Often, companies are aware that claims were forfeited, but lack direct communication from the Ministry prevents intervention.

Proposal
Require annual updates of company contact details, including directors, executives, and mine managers, ensuring hearing notices reach all relevant parties. Representation should require a signed resolution, failing which claims are deemed unauthorised.

xi. The progressive provision restricting EIA certificates to operationalised licences should be acknowledged. The previous legal position caused losses due to conflicting statutory requirements. The new provision addresses this gap.

xii. Farmer–miner conflicts remain contentious. While the Bill extends protections, several issues persist.

Proposal

1. Clarify limits on mining activities within farms based on size.
2. Cap the number of miners per farm unless consent is obtained.
3. Gazette minimum compensation payments.
4. Adopt best practices from other jurisdictions.
5. Merge new Bill proposals with existing Part V provisions.
6. Restrict unreasonable withholding of consent and clarify state intervention mechanisms.
7. Recognise judicial precedents reserving portions of farms for consent-based mining.

xiii. Inspections based on works rather than payments require clarity. Mining differs from farming; not all blocks can be worked simultaneously. Definitions of “works” must be clearly articulated to avoid arbitrary cancellation.

Proposal

1. Limit claim hoarding by restricting block numbers per individual or entity.

2. Enforce levy collection provisions already in law.

3. Allow the Ministry to retain a portion of generated income for inspections and verification.

xiv. Converting Special Grants into mining leases requires ensuring original reservation purposes no longer apply.

xv. Clause 3(2) should clarify that issuance of mining titles does not confer land ownership or rights to erect permanent structures without landholder consent.

xvi. Clause 4(1) lacks definitions such as “work” and “Cadastral System.” Approved cultivation schemes should include board oversight. The clause requires review for missing details and critical definitions.

xvii. To be continued – Part 2 in the making.

This document is the intellectual property of the author and may not be used, in whole or in part, without her consent. Authored by Thammary Brenda Vhiriri, a legal practitioner with extensive experience in the mining sector and land issues, having worked for the Ministry of Mines and the Zimbabwe Land Commission as Legal Counsel.
Contact: +263 772 979 277 | [email protected]