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Premier Targets Lithium Export Restart as Soft Lifting of Export Ban

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Premier Targets Lithium Export Restart as Soft Lifting of Export Ban

Premier African Minerals Limited says it is preparing to resume lithium concentrate exports after the Government of Zimbabwe signalled a shift from a blanket ban to a controlled quota-based system for producers, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The expected restart follows recent moves by authorities to grant export quotas to selected lithium miners, marking a policy adjustment after February’s suspension of lithium concentrate shipments, including cargo already in transit, as part of efforts to drive in-country beneficiation.

The ban formed part of a broader push to capture more value from Zimbabwe’s lithium resources, amid concerns that the country has been exporting raw material at significantly discounted prices while downstream processors earn substantially higher returns.

Lithium concentrates from Zimbabwe have typically fetched about US$375 per tonne, compared to more than US$20,000 per tonne for refined products on international markets, highlighting the scale of value leakage authorities are seeking to address.

Premier said ongoing engagement with regulators has now clarified the path toward a phased resumption of exports.

“The company notes recent developments in Zimbabwe’s lithium export policy following the government’s February 2026 decision to suspend exports of lithium concentrates and other raw minerals in order to promote in-country beneficiation and address regulatory concerns,” the company said.

“Subsequent industry engagement and regulatory clarification indicate that exports are expected to resume under a controlled framework, with approvals and quotas being granted to qualifying producers that meet specified criteria, including compliance with local processing and regulatory requirements.”

Under the revised framework, producers must commit to beneficiation investments, including plans to separate all economic minerals before export, develop lithium sulphate plants by January 2027, and install internationally accredited laboratories and on-site assay facilities within three months.

They are also required to fully declare mineral content in export consignments and publish financial statements starting December 2025.

Premier said it supports the policy direction, describing it as a pragmatic balance between enforcing value addition and sustaining sector activity.

Alongside the regulatory developments, the company is reinforcing operations at its Zulu Lithium and Tantalum Project after raising approximately £750,000 through a share issue in London.

The funding is being deployed to maintain operational momentum as the project moves from construction toward commissioning, while supporting installation and integration of the flotation plant—a critical component of the processing circuit.

Zulu remains central to Premier’s growth strategy in the lithium sector, with recent progress focused on the Xinhai flotation plant, which is designed to upgrade ore by separating spodumene from waste minerals such as quartz and feldspar.

Installation work has advanced in recent weeks, with site-based fabrication of piping, walkways, and flotation infrastructure being carried out by the project team under specialist supervision, positioning the operation for improved concentrate quality ahead of export resumption.

Mining Leads as Mutapa Investment Fund Unveils $1bn+ 2026 Deal Pipeline

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Mining Leads as Mutapa Investment Fund Unveils $1bn+ 2026 Deal Pipeline

Mining will anchor a more than $1 billion deal pipeline lined up for execution in 2026 by the Mutapa Investment Fund, as the sovereign fund steps up efforts to mobilise capital and build recurring income streams, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The pipeline, disclosed by Chief Investment Officer Simba Chinyemba alongside the fund’s FY2025 audited financial results, comprises four key transactions: a $75 million domestic syndicated mining facility, a $400 million commodity offtake and throughput structured financing arrangement, over $500 million in energy-related projects, and a $100 million rail financing facility.

Chinyemba said the transactions are advanced and execution-ready.

The $75 million mining syndication is expected to be raised from domestic lenders, including commercial banks, pension funds, and development finance institutions, to support expansion across the minerals portfolio. The facility is structured to distribute credit risk among multiple participants while positioning Mutapa as a local capital mobilisation anchor.

The mining cluster remains central to the fund’s strategy, with assets under Kuvimba Mining House recording significant valuation growth during the year, supported by firm gold prices and the restructuring of operations into commodity-focused verticals.

In parallel, the fund is pursuing a $400 million commodity offtake and throughput financing structure tied to mineral production. The arrangement is designed to secure funding against future output through contracted delivery agreements with international commodity buyers, trading houses, and potential sovereign counterparties.

The pipeline also includes more than $500 million in energy investments spanning power generation, transmission infrastructure, and renewable energy projects, as well as a $100 million financing facility for the National Railways of Zimbabwe to support rail network rehabilitation.

According to the fund, the transactions form part of a broader strategy to strengthen income generation and crowd in external capital, with Mutapa acting as a sovereign anchor investor rather than the sole funding source.

Financial results for the year reflect continued asset growth but a relatively modest earnings base. Total assets rose to $16.5 billion from $14.9 billion, driven largely by $1.37 billion in fair value gains on the investment portfolio. The fund reported a surplus of $21.7 million on total income of $60.3 million.

Mutapa closed the year with $9.9 million in cash and $43.7 million in liquid assets, underscoring its reliance on external capital mobilisation to fund the pipeline.

‘We Are Paying 40% of Our Sales to Government’, Lithium Producers Open Up on Crushing Tax Burden

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‘We Are Paying 40% of Our Sales to Government’, Lithium Producers Open Up on Crushing Tax Burden

As Arcadia’s US$400 million plant is completed, Bikita builds a caesium facility, and Kamativi recovers tin, miners say the fiscal regime needs to evolve with the industry.

The lithium sector is the jewel of Zimbabwe’s beneficiation agenda. Six large-scale producers have invested billions. Processing plants are rising. Export quotas have been granted. The government’s 2027 deadline for local processing is approaching.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

But beneath the headlines, a quieter story is unfolding. Lithium producers say they are being crushed by a tax burden that consumes nearly 40 percent of their sales, leaving little room for the very investments the government demands.

“We are paying 40 percent of our sales to the government,” one producer told Mining Zimbabwe. “We try our best to contribute, but we feel we are treated badly.”

This is not an attack on policy. It is a plea for partnership. And if both sides listen, the outcome could be billions more for the Treasury and a sustainable, thriving lithium industry.

The Arithmetic of Survival

Let us break down the numbers.

When a lithium producer sells a tonne of concentrate, the government takes:

  • 10% unbeneficiated export tax on gross fair market value
  • 7% royalty on lithium sales
  • 3% community development levy on lithium sales
  • 1% MMCZ marketing fee
  • 15.5% VAT on applicable transactions
  • Foreign currency retention requirements that effectively tax export earnings

Add corporate income tax, payroll taxes, and various other levies, and the total approaches 40 percent of sales revenue.

This is before operational costs. Before equipment. Before labour. Before power. Before maintenance.

“They will make sure operational costs are covered,” the producer said. “But after that, there is not much left.”

The Permit Crisis: Starting Over

Compounding the financial pressure is administrative uncertainty.

Several producers reported that their MMCZ export papers had been cancelled without clear guidance on how to proceed.

“We are not sure now whether we will start the whole process again or resume with the previous papers,” one miner said. “When we did everything right, our papers were cancelled anyway.”

The uncertainty creates delays. Delays create costs. Costs add to the 40 percent burden.

The Rare Earth Question: Government Loses Too

Producers are keenly aware that the government’s aggressive tax regime may be self-defeating.

If by-minerals such as tantalum, niobium, and caesium are not declared because it is not economically viable to separate them under the current fiscal framework, the government loses revenue on those minerals as well.

“If it’s viable, the rare earth within the products, the government also loses,” the producer said. “They missed the good window of good prices.”

Research presented by NUST lecturer Eng Mudono at a recent ZELO breakfast meeting estimated that Zimbabwe lost approximately US$400 million in unreported tantalum and US$30 million in unreported caesium from lithium concentrate exports.

That is government revenue that never reached the Treasury. That is value that left the country without a cent paid.

The Arcadia Example: Africa’s First Lithium Sulphate Plant

Among the three major processing facilities reshaping Zimbabwe’s lithium sector, Arcadia Lithium Mine stands out as the most advanced.

Operated by Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, a subsidiary of China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Arcadia has built a US$400 million lithium sulphate processing plant, the first of its kind in Africa and only the third globally.

The facility, located in Goromonzi, Mashonaland East Province, has reached its equipment commissioning phase and is expected to begin production in the first quarter of 2026. The plant has a design capacity of approximately 60,000 tonnes of lithium sulphate per annum.

According to PLZ General Manager Henry Zhu, the plant’s three production lines will process 500,000 tonnes of concentrate annually, converting it to around 80,000 tonnes of lithium sulphate.

“The lithium sulphate plant is a game-changer for our economy,” Zhu stated. “Not only has this plant created jobs and stimulated local economic activity, but it also showcases Zimbabwe’s potential as a major player in the global lithium market.”

The economic implications are already being felt. Beyond the capital investment, the plant’s construction has created numerous employment opportunities for residents of Goromonzi District, with further hiring expected upon operational launch.

Prospect expects to more than double its revenue once the plant comes into production, demonstrating the compelling economics of local processing.

The Bikita and Kamativi Examples: Market Decisions, Not Defiance

The government should take note of what is already happening across the sector.

Bikita Minerals, under its Chinese parent company Sinomine Resource Group, has built the world’s first caesium flotation plant, a US$35 million investment that extracts caesium from petalite tailings. Sinomine has also announced plans for a US$400 million smelting facility to produce battery-grade lithium hydroxide or carbonate.

Kamativi Mining Company is currently constructing a tin, tantalum, and niobium recovery system, expected to commence operations in September 2026.

These were not reactions to government pressure. They were market decisions. Bikita saw an opportunity to extract additional value from its tailings. Kamativi recognised that its pegmatites contain multiple economic minerals worth recovering.

“Bikita did it for market-based decisions,” the producer explained. “When lithium is good, we focus. It was a market decision.”

The lesson is that miners are not enemies of the state. They are businesses responding to price signals, operational constraints, and investment horizons. When the economics work, they invest.

The Laboratory Solution: A Network Already Being Built

One of the most practical steps the government could take is already underway.

On 14 April 2026, Cabinet approved the National Minerals Research and Analytical Scientific Laboratory Infrastructure Pillar, establishing a decentralised network of specialised analytical hubs at nine universities and scientific institutions across the country.

The University of Zimbabwe will serve as the apex hub for lithium, rare earth elements, and uranium. The National University of Science and Technology and Great Zimbabwe University will anchor platinum group metals and battery minerals. Midlands State University will provide analytical oversight for iron ore, chrome, and vanadium corridors.

“Government will end the costly and risky reliance on foreign laboratories for mineral certification through a decentralised network of specialised analytical hubs co-located at national universities and scientific institutions,” Information Minister Hon Zhemu Soda announced.

But a network of laboratories is only useful if it is used. The government must ensure these facilities are equipped, staffed, and funded to test every export consignment for all economic minerals present. The results should serve as the basis for taxation—not self-declaration, not trust, but empirical data.

If the government tests and finds tantalum, tax tantalum. If it finds caesium, tax caesium. If it finds rare earths, tax rare earths. The laboratory network gives the government the evidence it needs to capture value from every mineral in every concentrate.

The Infant Industry Argument

The lithium sector in Zimbabwe is, by any honest measure, brand new.

Before 2021, commercial lithium production was negligible. The current wave of investment has occurred almost entirely in the last four years. The sector is not a mature, cash-rich industry ready for heavy taxation. It is a newborn, still finding its feet, still building the plants that will one day deliver the beneficiation the government seeks.

“The sector is young,” the producer said. “The investment that the government now requires from us is heavy. This was supposed to be the first step, before the taxes, before the heavy demands.”

Between 2020 and 2025, Zimbabwe’s raw lithium exports surged from about US$7 million to nearly US$600 million. That is one of the fastest growth trajectories in the country’s mining history. But the export ban has now halted that momentum mid-flight.

Industry sources say Zimbabwe could be losing as much as US$60 million monthly in royalties and taxes following the indefinite ban. The five largest producers, employing about 9,000 workers, have scaled down operations and are largely mining to stockpile ore—a stopgap strategy that buys time but offers little certainty.

“At the moment, we are only stockpiling since the ban came into play. Costs of production are rising by the day,” a source said. “It is uncertain if firms will preserve jobs.”

Geology Abandoned for Processing

One of the most persistent gaps in Zimbabwe’s mining sector is the absence of comprehensive geological research. NDS2 identified exploration and geological data as priorities, but the funding has not followed.

“So much money is going to processing, and geology is abandoned,” the producer said. “The government should see this. The resource, is it good for that? Is there enough to do exploration?”

Without knowing what is in the ground, the country cannot attract the right investors. Without the right investors, the beneficiation agenda cannot succeed. Without success, the tax revenues will never materialise.

“The government should create an environment to encourage miners to produce rather than force them,” the producer said.

The One-Plant Problem

The government’s expectation that every producer build its own lithium sulphate plant is economically unrealistic.

“Having one plant for all miners is difficult. For all miners, it is not economical,” the producer said.

The solution, already working in the PGMs sector, is toll processing. Smaller miners send their concentrate to larger producers with excess capacity. Zimplats processes concentrate for Mimosa. The same model could work for lithium.

But the fiscal regime must recognise this reality. Forcing every producer to build its own plant, when the economics do not support it, is not a beneficiation strategy. It is a recipe for stranded assets.

The 11 Conditions: A Framework, Not a Final Word

The government has made progress. The 11 conditions issued by Mines Minister Hon Dr Eng Polite Kambamura on 7 April 2026 include mandatory declaration of all minerals before export and the establishment of assay laboratories at each producing mine within three months.

These conditions target the very practices that created the pricing gap. Financial transparency ends transfer pricing. Assay laboratories end under-declaration. Beneficiation requirements end the export of raw material altogether.

But a condition is not implementation. A laboratory is not a policy. The missing link is a fiscal regime that recognises the reality of an infant industry.

What Needs to Happen: A Partnership Approach

The producers are not asking for a free ride. They are asking for a fiscal regime that recognises the reality of an infant industry and creates a genuine partnership between government and miners.

“We are willing to follow government rules, but sometimes some processes should fund themselves,” the producer said.

Invictus Raises $10 Million for Muzarabani Well as Zimbabwe Oil Search Intensifies

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Invictus Raises $10 Million for Muzarabani Well as Zimbabwe Oil Search Intensifies

Invictus Energy has raised A$10 million through a share placement to institutional and sophisticated investors, funding the drilling of its high-impact Musuma-1 exploration well in the Muzarabani area as the company pushes toward commercial production in one of Africa’s last untested onshore basins, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The Australian explorer issued 166.7 million shares at A$0.060 each, a 0.6 percent discount to the 15-day volume-weighted average price but a 6.8 percent premium to the 30-day average. Investors will also receive one attaching option for every two shares allocated, exercisable at A$0.10 with a two-year expiry.

The placement received strong support from both existing and new shareholders, according to Managing Director Scott Macmillan, who said the funds will be primarily allocated to the Musuma-1 well, which is designed as a simple vertical well to a planned depth of approximately 1,500 metres.

Musuma-1 targets the Dande Formation, a relatively shallow reservoir that has already shown signs of hydrocarbons. When Invictus drilled the Mukuyu-2 appraisal well, the Dande Formation at that location exhibited good reservoir quality and residual hydrocarbons, indicating that an active petroleum system capable of charging the formation is present. However, Mukuyu-2’s Dande interval did not contain a trapped accumulation, likely due to local trap breach.

Musuma’s structure, by contrast, displays seismic characteristics indicative of an intact trap, including a consistent “flat spot” observed across multiple seismic lines and survey vintages. A flat spot is a horizontal reflector that indicates a gas-water contact, and together with updip brightening, these direct hydrocarbon indicators significantly enhance confidence in the presence of hydrocarbons at Musuma.

The prospect targets 1.2 trillion cubic feet of gas and 73 million barrels of condensate on a gross mean unrisked basis. Success at Musuma would unlock a new play fairway in the eastern portion of Invictus’ 360,000-hectare acreage position, expanding the company’s resource base beyond the already proven Mukuyu gas field.

The Cabora Bassa Basin in northern Zimbabwe remains one of the last underexplored large frontier rift basins in onshore Africa. Invictus holds an 80 percent interest in the project through its subsidiary Geo Associates, with the Mutapa Investment Fund holding the remaining 20 percent.

The Mukuyu gas field, discovered by Invictus, has been described as the second-largest petroleum find in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2023 by Wood Mackenzie. Independent estimates suggest the field could hold up to 20 trillion cubic feet of gas and 845 million barrels of conventional gas condensate.

The company has already secured all necessary permits for exploration and pilot commercialisation activity. Zimbabwe’s Environmental Management Agency renewed the Environmental Impact Assessment for Special Grant 4571 and Exclusive Prospecting Orders 1848 and 1849 through March 2027, covering the project area. Health, safety, and environment management plans are also in place.

The PPSA and Commercial Pathway

Invictus has scheduled the execution of its Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement with the Government of Zimbabwe for April, though officials in Harare have yet to confirm a specific date. The PPSA will establish the legal and fiscal framework for petroleum operations and will serve as the model contract for all future participants in Zimbabwe’s oil and gas industry.

Once the PPSA is executed, Invictus intends to fast-track early production through a gas-to-power pilot project. The company has already secured an EIA permit for a pilot production scheme at Eureka Gold Mine as a proof-of-concept. Site construction for the Musuma-1 well pad will commence in due course, timed for completion ahead of drilling preparations in the second half of 2026.

The company is securing the necessary drilling rig and service contracts following the receipt of proposals from major service providers. After drilling, the well will be logged and evaluated. If hydrocarbons are encountered in significant quantities, comprehensive well testing will follow, designed to measure flow rates, reservoir pressure, and fluid characteristics.

The A$10 million placement provides a critical funding bridge for Invictus, which reported a cash balance of A$4.51 million as of December 2025 and a half-year net loss of A$4.23 million. The company’s auditor, BDO, had previously flagged a material uncertainty regarding Invictus’ ability to continue as a going concern without additional funding.

Alpine Capital acted as sole lead manager and bookrunner for the placement, receiving a 6 percent capital raising fee and 27.8 million broker options on the same terms as the attaching options. Settlement is expected on 28 April 2026.

Macmillan will host a shareholder briefing webinar on 22 April to provide a detailed update on the Musuma-1 campaign and the broader Cabora Bassa development pathway.

Kavango Resources plc says its long-delayed acquisition of the Nara Gold Project in Zimbabwe is now nearing completion

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Kavango Resources plc says its long-delayed acquisition of the Nara Gold Project in Zimbabwe is now nearing completion, marking a potential breakthrough after months of regulatory and administrative setbacks, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The Victoria Falls Stock Exchange-listed miner confirmed it has signed a Deed of Variation (DoV) with the seller, clarifying the final steps required to conclude the transaction under the original call option agreement signed in June 2023.

Kavango exercised the option in July 2025 to acquire 100% of the 45-claim project, but completion has repeatedly slipped as the parties worked through Zimbabwe’s mining title transfer requirements.

The process, which requires approval from the Mining Commissioner and verification that each claim complies with statutory obligations such as fees, minimum work requirements, and environmental standards, pushed initial deadlines from December 2025 to February 2026, then into March, before being left open-ended.

In an update on the transaction, the company said it has now resolved key outstanding issues around the structure and execution of the deal, signalling that completion is close.

“…Kavango and the Seller have signed a Deed of Variation in respect of the call option agreement dated 23 June 2023, to address the mechanics of completion, which we anticipate occurring shortly. Kavango has transferred the balance of the consideration into an escrow account to be transferred to the Seller upon completion of the final documentation.

The parties are currently discussing the possible sale and purchase of the operating company, Romjack Mining (Pvt) Ltd, so that Kavango can seamlessly continue the current operations at Nara,” the company said.

Executive Chairman and Interim CEO Peter Wynter Bee said the company is positioning itself to integrate the asset into its broader Zimbabwean portfolio.

“We are excited to be embarking on the Nara project. The Company is committed to building upon the success of the Nara Gold Project for the benefit of its shareholders and the local community,” he said.

He added that Kavango is evaluating the co-location of its exploration team to improve efficiency and support development across its projects.

For a multi-claim asset like Nara, the administrative burden has proven significant, reflecting wider capacity constraints within the system.

Kavango has consistently maintained that both parties remain committed to closing the transaction. The latest update suggests the deal is now entering its final phase, with the company confirming it has placed the remaining purchase consideration into an escrow account, to be released once final documentation is completed.

The Nara acquisition is central to Kavango’s strategy to transition into a gold producer, providing near-term cash flow to underpin its wider exploration portfolio. The prolonged delays have also underscored the extent to which administrative processes in Zimbabwe can influence deal timelines, even where commercial terms are already agreed.

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 22 April 2026

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Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 22 April 2026, from the official gold buyer and exporter Fidelity Gold Refinery (FGR).

1 oz = 31.1035 g

CategoryPrice ($/g)Price ($/oz)
SG 90% and above141.81
4,410.30
SG 85% but less than 90%140.314,363.64
SG 80% but less than 85%138.814,316.99
SG 75% but less than 80%137.31
4,270.35
Sample (5–10g)135.06
4,200.3
Fire Assay CASH142.564,433.62

 

Note: The Fire Assay cash price applies to gold above 100g, with no sample deduction.

A sample of not more than 10g is deducted for the Fire Assay Transfer price.

Blanket production decreases 20.9% as Q1 2026 output falls to 14,767 oz

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Caledonia maintains full-year guidance of 72,000–76,500 ounces, expects stronger second-half performance as operational initiatives take effect

Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc has announced that gold production at its Blanket Mine in Gwanda fell to 14,767 ounces in the first quarter of 2026, representing a 20.9% decrease from the 18,671 ounces produced in the first quarter of 2025, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The decline also marks a 15.0% drop from the fourth quarter of 2025, when Blanket produced 17,367 ounces. The Q4 2025 figure itself represented a 12.5% decrease from 19,841 ounces in the same period of 2024, underscoring a trend of operational headwinds that began in the second half of last year.

Caledonia stated that the lower quarterly result was anticipated, reflecting mining sequence and anticipated access constraints to higher-grade, higher-volume areas. Production during the quarter was also impacted by equipment availability issues and challenging ground conditions.

“The challenges experienced in the first quarter do not reflect the underlying quality of the orebody or the long-term fundamentals of the operation,” said Mark Learmonth, Chief Executive Officer of Caledonia.

Despite the weaker start to the year, the company remains comfortable with Blanket’s full-year production guidance of 72,000 to 76,500 ounces. Caledonia had previously stated in its March 23, 2026 announcement that production is expected to be weighted towards the second half of the year as operational initiatives take effect.

Several measures are being implemented to address the production constraints:

A new mine shift system, currently being implemented, will increase mine production from six to seven days per week and is expected to reduce worker fatigue while supporting increased ore production.

A contractor has been appointed to accelerate access to higher-grade ore sources, addressing the grade constraints that affected both Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.

An additional ball mill was commissioned in the second quarter of 2026, increasing milling capacity. Plant performance remained strong during the quarter, with 202,217 tonnes milled and good operational availability across the processing circuit.

“Pleasingly, plant performance remained strong, with 202,217 tonnes milled and good operational availability across the processing circuit. This is an important reflection of our continued investment in the future of the processing facility,” Learmonth noted.

The production challenges in recent quarters stand in contrast to Caledonia’s strong financial performance for the full year 2025. The company reported revenue of US$267 million, a 46% increase from the prior year, while profit after tax surged 193% to US$67.5 million. The significant profit growth was driven primarily by a higher gold price environment, with realised gold prices rising 55% to US$4,057 per ounce in Q4 2025.

Blanket produced 76,213 ounces for the full year 2025, meeting increased guidance of 75,500 to 79,500 ounces and remaining nearly identical to the prior two years.

Beyond Blanket, Caledonia continues to advance its larger-scale Bilboes gold project. In February 2026, the company appointed Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe and CBZ Bank Limited as co-lead arrangers for an interim funding facility of up to US$150 million, forming part of a four-part funding strategy to develop what will become Zimbabwe’s largest gold mine.

Once operational, Bilboes is forecast to reach a steady annual output of 200,000 ounces from 2029 for an initial period of 10 years, with first production scheduled for late 2028. The company owns 100% of Bilboes, compared to a 64% stake in Blanket Mine.

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 20 April 2026

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 20 April 2026, from the official gold buyer and exporter Fidelity Gold Refinery (FGR).

1 oz = 31.1035 g

CategoryPrice ($/g)Price ($/oz)
SG 90% and above142.464,430.80
SG 85% but less than 90%140.954,383.84
SG 80% but less than 85%139.454,337.19
SG 75% but less than 80%137.944,290.23
Sample (5–10g)135.684,219.94
Fire Assay CASH143.224,454.44

 

Note: The Fire Assay cash price applies to gold above 100g, with no sample deduction.

A sample of not more than 10g is deducted for the Fire Assay Transfer price.

Chromium Industry Needs ‘Perfect Alignment’ of Power, Policy and Green Energy, ICDA Warns

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The global chromium industry faces a defining moment: to thrive, it requires nothing less than “perfect alignment between political stability, access to reliable and cost-effective energy, and green energy,” according to Shiraz Neffati, Executive Director of the International Chromium Development Association (ICDA).

By Rudairo Mapuranga

Speaking at the Africa Chromium Week 2026 Conference, which happened in Victoria Falls last week, Neffati laid out a stark framework for an industry navigating resource nationalism, decarbonisation mandates, and supply chain realignment.

“Chromium is set to be a critical raw material for several jurisdictions,” Neffati said, explaining that the metal’s role extends far beyond its traditional anchor in stainless steel. Speciality steel applications, the defence industry, aerospace, energy, and engineering sectors all depend on chromium. “If you don’t have chromium, these applications cannot exist.”

Her remarks come as Zimbabwe, host of the conference, aggressively pivots from a raw chrome ore exporter to a ferrochrome processing hub. The country holds the world’s second-largest chrome reserves, underpinned by the mineral-rich Great Dyke geological formation.

But that ambition collides with a brute physics problem: ferrochrome smelting is among the most energy-intensive industrial processes, consuming 3,500–4,000 kWh per tonne. Zimbabwe’s grid, already hobbled by debt and generation deficits, cannot absorb significantly more load without crippling other users.

The government’s solution, articulated over the past two years, forces the industry’s hand. Ferrochrome miners have been given until 2026 to develop their own captive power generation, primarily from renewable sources, ending a period of subsidised grid tariffs.

Neffati’s emphasis on “green energy” signals that sustainability is no longer a peripheral concern but a core competitiveness issue. Global stainless steel buyers, particularly in Europe and North America, are increasingly pricing in carbon intensity. Zimbabwe’s chrome sector, if it powers expansion with coal or an unreliable grid, risks being locked out of premium markets.

Yet the “alignment” he describes is fragile. Policy consistency, investment in transmission infrastructure, and tariff predictability remain open questions. Some producers are moving ahead: Jin An Group recently launched a US$20 million, 20-megawatt solar project for its Gweru smelter, part of a broader US$140 million captive power drive. But whether smaller players can replicate that capital-intensive model is uncertain.

Neffati’s framing of chromium as a “critical raw material” carries weight. The European Union, United States, and other major economies have designated chromium as strategically important due to supply concentration and lack of substitutes. Zimbabwe’s policy shift, including an ongoing ban on raw chrome ore exports and a new 5% VAT on unbeneficiated chrome, leverages that scarcity to force industrialisation.

The ICDA conference, which ran from 14 to 16 April in Victoria Falls, has drawn policymakers, industry leaders, and analysts. Vice President Dr. Constantino Chiwenga is representing President Mnangagwa, underscoring the government’s top-down commitment. Sessions have addressed South Africa’s market position, Indonesia’s ferrochrome expansion, and the logistics of moving processed chrome via regional rail and the Port of Maputo.

For investors and miners who were in the room, the message was clear. Chromium demand will grow, driven by decarbonisation infrastructure, electric vehicles, and speciality alloys. But capturing that demand requires more than digging ore. It requires mastering the triad of politics, power, and sustainability, and getting the alignment exactly right.

Whether Zimbabwe can deliver all three before its export bans bite and its smelters go hungry for electricity remains the central question of this week’s deliberations.

Beneficiation Needs Supply: Why Zimbabwe’s Mining Industrialisation Agenda Stands on a Broken Supply Chain

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Zimbabwe’s beneficiation and value addition agenda is the most ambitious industrial policy the country has undertaken in a generation. The 25 February 2026 ban on raw mineral exports, the 11 conditions for lithium producers, and the new mineral value chain framework approved by Cabinet all point in one direction: Zimbabwe will no longer export raw minerals. It will process them here.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

But there is a problem. A quiet problem. A problem that nobody is talking about at Cabinet briefings or investor conferences.

Beneficiation needs supply. Processing plants need spare parts. Concentrators need consumables. Refineries need maintenance. And right now, the supply chain that is supposed to support this industrial revolution is broken.

Let me take you through what I have learned, piece by piece.

The Price Gap Is a Barrier to Beneficiation

Let me start with a story.

A few weeks ago, I was talking to a miner who is building a processing plant. He showed me his budget. It was detailed. It was professional. It had line items for everything, except one thing.

I asked him about the equipment. Where was he buying it from? He looked at me like I had asked a silly question.

“China,” he said. “Where else?”

I asked him why not buy locally. He laughed.

“Let me give you an example. There is a piece of equipment that costs US$1,000 in China. The same equipment, from a local supplier here, costs US$3,800. Sometimes US$4,000. Same brand. Same product. Three to four times more expensive.”

He told me that even after shipping, import duties, and all the paperwork, it is still cheaper to bring it from China than to buy it from a supplier in Harare.

“I want to support local businesses. I really do. But I cannot pay four times the price. My shareholders would fire me. My investors would pull out. The math does not work.”

This is not a small problem. This is the problem.

The government wants miners to build processing plants. But building a plant requires equipment. And equipment in Zimbabwe costs three to four times more than it does in China. So miners import. And when miners import, local suppliers lose. When local suppliers lose, local manufacturing capacity shrinks. When local manufacturing capacity shrinks, the beneficiation agenda becomes dependent on foreign supply chains.

And a beneficiation agenda dependent on foreign supply chains is not sustainable. It is not industrialisation. It is a substitution.

Even Basic Consumables Are Hard to Find

The problem is not just about expensive equipment. It is about the absence of basic consumables that mines need every single day.

I visited another mine. This one was already operational. The maintenance manager walked me through his workshop. He pointed to a truck that was not moving.

“That truck has been sitting there for ten days,” he said, “waiting for a part.”

I asked him what part. He showed me. It was not complicated. It was not high-tech. It was a basic component that any mining operation needs.

“I called every supplier in Harare. Nothing. I called Bulawayo. Nothing. I called Gweru. Nothing. I ended up ordering from South Africa.”

Ten days waiting. Ten days of a truck idle. Ten days of lost production.

“Now imagine this happens to a lithium sulphate plant,” he said. “Imagine we are processing high-value material and a pump fails. If I cannot get a replacement fast, the whole operation stops. That is not just lost time. That is lost revenue. Lots of it.”

He told me that even for basic consumables—filters, belts, bearings—the local market is thin, sometimes nonexistent.

“We want to buy local. I am tired of importing everything. But local suppliers often do not have what we need. So we wait or we pay premium prices. Neither is good for business.”

Local Manufacturers Are Operating at 20 Per cent Capacity

Let me take you to a different place: a manufacturing company in Bulawayo.

The owner showed me around his factory. It was impressive. Rows of machines. Skilled workers. A quality control system that would impress any auditor.

But the machines were not running. Most of them were silent.

“We are operating at 20 per cent capacity,” he told me. “Our competitors in South Africa are at 100 per cent. Our competitors in China are at 100 per cent. We are at 20 per cent.”

I asked him why.

“Cheap imports,” he said. “Some of them are smuggled. Some are just cheap because they come from factories that produce ten times what we produce. Either way, we cannot compete on price. So we sit idle. Our machines sit idle. Our workers sit idle.”

He explained the arithmetic to me slowly, as if I were a child.

Low utilisation means higher per-unit costs. Higher per-unit costs mean higher prices. Higher prices mean no customers. No customers means low utilisation.

“It is a cycle,” he said. “And I do not know how to break it. We have the skills. We have the facilities. We want the business. But we cannot sell at a loss. And we cannot sell at a price that is three times higher than what the customer can get from China.”

Suppliers Are Not Engaging Miners

Here is the part that frustrates me the most, because this one is fixable. This one does not require new laws or foreign investment. It requires a conversation.

I sat down with a miner who has been in the industry for twenty years. He knows what he needs. He knows what he wants. He knows what he is willing to pay for.

“The suppliers do not ask us what we need,” he said. “They just show up with products and expect us to buy them.”

He gave me an example. A supplier brought in equipment that met Chinese standards, but his operation was not set up for those standards. The connections were different. The specifications were different. The whole system was incompatible.

“The equipment sat in a warehouse, unused. We paid for it because we had to. But we never used it.”

He shook his head.

“There is a mismatch. They sell what they have. They do not ask what we need. If they just came and talked to us—asked questions, understood our operations, listened to our problems—they would sell more. We would buy more. Everyone would win.”

I asked him if any supplier had ever come to visit his mine—not to sell something, but just to understand.

He thought for a moment.

“No,” he said. “Not once.”

Some Miners Have Found a Workaround

When the formal supply chain fails, miners create their own solutions.

I visited a community engineering company in one of the mining districts. It was started by a group of miners who got tired of waiting for spare parts.

“We could not get what we needed from the suppliers, so we decided to make it ourselves,” one of them told me.

They started small. A few tools. A few skilled workers. Word spread. Soon, other miners were coming to them for repairs, parts, and advice.

“We are not big. We cannot supply a whole processing plant. But for the small things—the things that break often, the things that stop production—we are faster than anyone. And we are cheaper than anyone.”

I asked him if they could scale up—if they could supply the big mines, processing plants, and refineries.

“We would love to. But we do not have the capital, the equipment, or the support. We are a workaround, not a solution.”

The Beneficiation Agenda Depends on Solving This

Let me connect the dots for you.

The government’s beneficiation strategy is built on a simple premise: process minerals here, capture value here, create jobs here.

But processing minerals here requires functional supply chains. A lithium sulphate plant cannot run without spare parts. A concentrator cannot operate without consumables. A refinery cannot function without maintenance services.

If every spare part, consumable, and maintenance service has to be imported from China or South Africa, then the beneficiation agenda becomes an import-dependent, foreign-currency-consuming exercise.

That is not industrialisation. That is substitution.

“We are building these beautiful plants,” one miner said to me, “but we are not building the ecosystem around them. We are not building the supply chain. We are not building the local capacity to keep them running. And that means they will always be dependent on someone else.”

There Are Signs of Progress

I do not want to be all doom and gloom. There are signs of progress—small signs, but signs.

The Zimbabwe Miners Federation has partnered with Dinson Iron and Steel Company to boost local machinery production.

“Gone are the days of importing products such as bow and hammer mills, which are made from steel,” ZMF president Henrietta Rushwaya said.

Local engineering firms like Value Engineering are also stepping up, providing machining, fabrication, and hydraulic support to mining operations across the country.

“We’re helping clients reduce costly downtime, which directly impacts production and revenue,” mechanical engineer Alfred Makuyana said.

These are small steps, but they are steps in the right direction.

What Needs to Happen Now

The disconnect between miners and suppliers is not insurmountable, but closing it requires action on three fronts.

For suppliers: Stop selling what you have. Start supplying what miners need. Visit the mines. Ask questions. Understand the operations. Price competitively. Recognise that the market is small but loyal. Miners will support local suppliers who offer fair prices and reliable service.

For miners: Where possible, support local engineering companies. Provide feedback to suppliers about what is needed. Recognise that local suppliers cannot compete on price if they are operating at 20 percent capacity while Chinese competitors operate at 100 percent.

For government: Support local manufacturing through policy. The DISCO partnership is a start, but more needs to be done. Enforce anti-smuggling laws to stop cheap imports from flooding the market. Provide incentives for local manufacturers to expand capacity. Recognise that the beneficiation agenda will fail if it is built on a broken supply chain.

I have been writing about Zimbabwe’s mining sector for a long time. I have seen policies come and go. I have seen strategies announced and abandoned. I have seen conferences full of promises and boardrooms empty of action.

But this beneficiation agenda feels different. It feels real. The ban is in place. The conditions are set. The plants are being built.

But none of it will matter if the supply chain is broken, because a lithium sulphate plant is just an expensive pile of metal if you cannot get a spare part when something breaks.

And something always breaks.

The path forward is not complicated. Suppliers need to engage miners. Miners need to support local suppliers. Government needs to level the playing field.

The alternative is a beneficiation agenda built on Chinese spare parts, South African consumables, and imported expertise. That is not the industrial revolution Zimbabwe is trying to build. It is the same extractive model, dressed up in new clothes.

The clock is ticking. The plants are being built. The ban is in place. The only missing piece is the supply chain to keep it all running.

The question is whether Zimbabwe will build it, or watch it be imported.