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As the government pushes for a 26% stake in mining projects, investors face a delicate balancing act between resource nationalism and investment certainty. Zimbabwe wants a piece of its mining pie, not just through taxes, royalties, and beneficiation conditions, but an actual stake, a seat at the table.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The government has signalled its intention to hold a 26% free-carry stake in new mining projects and is preparing to negotiate with existing operators to acquire a similar shareholding. The policy, first floated in late 2024, is expected to be introduced in 2026, and it has set the industry abuzz with equal parts curiosity and concern.

But here is the question that nobody has answered satisfactorily: Will miners who were promised 100% ownership be willing to give up a chunk of their projects? And what does this mean for Zimbabwe as a destination for investment?

What Is a Free Carry?

Let us start with clarity.

A free-carry stake means the government receives an equity interest in a mining project without contributing capital to exploration, development, or construction costs. The government’s carry is essentially free. It does not pay for its shares. Instead, it receives them as a condition of the mining licence.

The government then receives dividends proportionate to its shareholding once the project becomes profitable. It bears no risk during the exploration and development phases. It contributes no capital during construction. It simply waits for the project to succeed and then collects.

From a government perspective, this is an attractive model. From an investor’s perspective, it is a direct transfer of value from the company to the state.

What the Government Is Saying

Mines Secretary Pfungwa Kunaka has been open about the government’s ambitions.

“We need to move to a level where we reach 26% shareholding in most of the big projects,” Kunaka told Bloomberg. “A lot of these things would take negotiations with the investors that are on the ground.”

He acknowledged that changing the rules mid-game is delicate.

“Obviously, when you have decisions which were made some years back, and decisions were made on the basis of a certain framework, you cannot just willy-nilly go and change that. It takes negotiations.”

The government already holds a 15% free-carry stake in platinum miner Karo Resources, providing a precedent for the model. The question is whether that precedent can be extended across the sector.

The Investor’s Dilemma

Now, let me take you inside the mind of an investor.

You are a mining company. You have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in exploration, feasibility studies, and construction. You have taken all the risk. You have spent years navigating regulatory hurdles, infrastructure deficits, and commodity price volatility. You were promised 100% ownership. Your financial models were built on that promise.

Now, the government wants 26%.

Not as a loan. Not as a partnership where they contribute capital. As a free carry. They want equity without investment. They want dividends without risk.

What should be done?

The answer is not simple. Some investors may accept it as the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe. Others may reconsider their commitments. And for projects that have not yet broken ground, the calculus changes entirely.

The Production Sharing Alternative

Here is where the conversation becomes more interesting.

A production sharing model might be a more elegant solution than a free-carry equity stake.

Under a production sharing agreement, the government does not take an equity stake. Instead, it takes a share of the actual minerals produced. The company recovers its costs from a portion of production, and the remaining profit from minerals are split between the company and the government according to an agreed formula.

The advantages are clear:

• No dilution of ownership. The company retains 100% equity but shares production.
• Alignment of interests. Both parties benefit when production increases.
• Flexibility. The share can be adjusted based on profitability, commodity prices, or investment levels.
• No valuation disputes. There is no argument about what the company is worth or what 26% should cost.

For Zimbabwe, a production sharing model could deliver the same economic benefits, government participation in mineral wealth, without the investor hostility that comes with expropriating equity.

The Lithium Sector Test Case

Consider Zimbabwe’s lithium sector.

Large-scale producers, Sinomine’s Bikita Minerals, Chengxin Lithium’s Sabi Star Mine, Yahua Group’s Kamativi Lithium Company, Huayou Cobalt’s Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, Tsingshan’s Gwanda Lithium Mine, have already invested billions of dollars under the 100% ownership promise.

These companies are currently building lithium sulphate plants to comply with the government’s beneficiation deadline of January 2027. They are spending hundreds of millions more on processing infrastructure. They are employing thousands of Zimbabweans.

If the government now demands a 26% free-carry stake, what happens?

Will the companies accept it? Will they negotiate? Or will they recalculate their returns and conclude that Zimbabwe is no longer worth the risk?

The government’s argument is that the free-carry stake represents the value of the mineral resource itself, the ore in the ground belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, and the free carry is a way of recognising that ownership. It is a compelling argument, but it does not change the arithmetic for the investor.

The Tax Question

If the government takes a 26% free-carry stake, what happens to taxes?

Currently, mining companies pay royalties ranging from 1% to 10%, depending on the mineral, corporate income tax of 24.72% for mining operations, and various levies, including the Community Development Levy.

If the government is now also receiving dividends from its 26% stake, should taxes be reduced? The argument is simple: the government is now both a shareholder and a tax collector. If it is benefiting directly from profits through dividends, perhaps the tax burden on the remaining 74% should be adjusted.

The counterargument is equally simple: taxes are the price of operating in Zimbabwe. Dividends are a separate return on equity. The two are not interchangeable.

This is a conversation that needs to happen before the policy is implemented, not after.

The Dividend Declaration Problem

Here is a practical concern that is rarely discussed.

If the government holds a 26% free-carry stake, it is entitled to 26% of declared dividends. But what if the company does not declare dividends? What if it reinvests profits into expansion, or uses them to service debt, or simply accumulates them as retained earnings?

In many jurisdictions, mining companies are notorious for not paying dividends, preferring to reinvest cash flow into new projects or acquisitions. The government’s free-carry stake could end up being worth very little if dividends are never declared.

The solution is to negotiate dividend policies as part of the free-carry agreement. Minimum payout ratios. Time bound distribution requirements. Mechanisms to ensure that the government’s participation is not rendered worthless by corporate financial engineering.

The Broader Context: Resource Nationalism in Africa

Zimbabwe is not alone in pursuing greater value from its mineral wealth.

Across Africa, countries are tightening their grip on natural resources. Tanzania renegotiated its mining contracts. The Democratic Republic of Congo increased state ownership in mining projects. Namibia banned the export of unprocessed critical minerals. Ghana revised its fiscal terms.

Zimbabwe’s 26% free-carry proposal fits within this broader trend. The question is whether Zimbabwe can execute it in a way that does not trigger capital flight.

Finance Permanent Secretary George Guvamanga recently told investors at the Investing in Africa Mining Indaba that Zimbabwe offers “world-class geology, competitive operating costs, and a legislated, transparent fiscal regime”. He warned that Zimbabwe is “not seeking speculative capital” but “long-term, technically competent, and well capitalised investors”.

The free-carry policy will test whether that message holds. If investors perceive the policy as opportunistic expropriation, Zimbabwe’s safe haven narrative will collapse. If it is negotiated fairly, transparently, and predictably, it could become a model for resource nationalism done right.

The Verdict: Production Sharing Over Free Carry

Here is my view.

Free carry is a blunt instrument. It takes equity without contribution. It changes the rules mid-game. It creates winners and losers based on negotiation skill rather than economic merit.

A production sharing model is more elegant. It aligns interests. It avoids valuation disputes. It gives the government a share of production without diluting ownership.

If Zimbabwe wants to participate in mining profits without scaring away investment, it should look to production sharing, not free carry. The government should take a share of what comes out of the ground, not a share of the company that digs it up.

The difference may seem technical. But for investors, it is the difference between partnership and expropriation.

What Comes Next

The policy is expected to be introduced in 2026. Negotiations with existing operators will follow. The details, which projects are affected, how the 26% is valued, what dividend policies apply, will determine whether this policy unlocks value or destroys it.

The lithium sector will be the test case. If the government can negotiate fairly with the six large-scale producers, acknowledging their existing investments while securing a fair share of future returns, the policy could succeed. If it demands 26% without compromise, the investment climate will suffer.

The government’s argument is compelling: the mineral wealth belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, and the people deserve a direct stake in its extraction. But the manner of that stake matters as much as the principle.

A production sharing model would achieve the same goal without the investor hostility. It is not too late to pivot.

The clock is ticking. The investors are watching. And Zimbabwe’s reputation as a destination for mining capital hangs in the balance.

Zimbabwe is moving to align its chrome industry with tightening global climate rules, as rising carbon costs in key export markets begin to reshape how ferrochrome is produced and traded internationally, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The shift builds on gains from the 2022 chrome ore export ban, which pushed producers into local beneficiation and lifted ferrochrome output. With smelting capacity expanding and new investments entering the sector, attention is gradually shifting from production volumes to the carbon footprint of that growth.

In his speech, delivered by Vice President Constantine Chiwenga at Africa Chromium Week 2026, Mnangagwa said sustainability is now central to the future of the chrome industry as global markets adjust to carbon pricing systems, particularly in Europe.

“Beneficiation strategy must now be anchored on sustainability. As carbon pricing regimes take effect across key markets, particularly in Europe, the global chromium industry is undergoing a fundamental shift toward low-emissions supply chains and cleaner production systems. This is not a distant transition, it is already reshaping competitiveness and market access.”

Mnangagwa said the industry can no longer rely on high-carbon production models if it is to remain competitive in export markets that are increasingly factoring emissions into trade decisions.

The remarks signal a broader shift in Zimbabwe’s chrome strategy, moving beyond output expansion toward aligning production with emerging global environmental standards.

Ferrochrome smelting remains highly energy-intensive, exposing producers to tightening carbon-related trade measures, particularly in Europe, where emissions compliance rules are becoming more stringent.

As a result, new investments in the sector are increasingly being structured around energy efficiency improvements and integrated power solutions aimed at reducing emissions while sustaining output growth.

The shift is also beginning to influence investment flows, with financiers placing greater emphasis on environmental performance and governance standards when assessing mining and metallurgical projects.

Government officials have framed the transition as a strategic opportunity to position Zimbabwe more firmly within global supply chains that are increasingly sensitive to carbon intensity.

Mnangagwa also indicated that Zimbabwe is exploring longer-term opportunities in carbon-linked and environmental markets as part of its broader industrial strategy.

However, the transition will require sustained investment in energy infrastructure, technology upgrades, and skills development across the sector.

As global chromium markets evolve alongside stricter climate policies, Zimbabwe faces the challenge of maintaining production growth while improving emissions performance to remain competitive.

Energy has quietly become one of the most decisive factors shaping mining competitiveness. Beneath the headlines of rising copper and cobalt demand lies a more immediate operational reality: keeping the lights on is becoming more expensive, less predictable and increasingly complex.

By Heleen Katja Tshibumbu

For decades, mining operations across northern Zambia and the southern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have relied on a combination of grid-supplied hydropower and diesel-based backup generation. That model is now under strain. Hydropower output has become less reliable due to recurring drought conditions and infrastructure limitations, while diesel (long considered a dependable fallback) is emerging as a costly and volatile liability. (IEA, 2022).

The latest surge in global oil prices, driven in part by geopolitical instability in the Middle East and ongoing risks to key supply routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, has brought this vulnerability into sharp focus. For Copperbelt operators, far removed from global oil hubs and dependent on complex overland fuel logistics, the impact is amplified. Diesel is no longer just an operational input; it is a strategic exposure.

The economics are difficult to ignore. Diesel-generated electricity in remote African mining environments typically costs between $0.15 and $0.50 per kilowatt-hour, with landlocked regions such as the Copperbelt often sitting at the upper end of that range due to transport and handling costs. These figures are not static. They’re quite fluid and move with global oil prices, exchange rates and supply chain disruptions, introducing a level of cost volatility that complicates planning and erodes margins. (IEA, 2022).

The numbers tell a compelling story. Solar PV combined with battery storage can now deliver electricity at between $0.06 and $0.20 per kilowatt-hour in many African contexts, while hybrid systems integrating renewables with diesel typically range between $0.08 and $0.25 per kilowatt-hour (IRENA, 2023; World Bank, 2020; IFC, 2019). Even at the upper end, these costs compare favourably to diesel-only generation, and at the lower end they represent a step change in energy economics.

Across the Copperbelt itself, early examples of this transition are already visible. In Zambia, First Quantum Minerals has integrated large-scale solar generation into its operations at the Kansanshi Mine, reducing reliance on grid and diesel supply while improving energy security. Similarly, Barrick Gold Corporation has advanced renewable energy integration at the Lumwana Mine, where solar power is being deployed to stabilise energy supply and offset fuel consumption. In the DRC, operators in the Kolwezi region are increasingly evaluating hybrid systems as grid constraints and diesel costs converge, signalling a broader regional shift.

For a Copperbelt mine currently producing power at around $0.30 per kilowatt-hour using diesel, a transition to a hybrid system could reduce costs to approximately $0.15 per kilowatt-hour. In more optimised scenarios, particularly where solar resources are strong, costs can fall closer to $0.10 per kilowatt-hour. This translates into potential savings of between 50% and 70% per unit of electricity generated, fundamentally reshaping the cost base of mining operations.

To be clear, the shift is not about eliminating diesel altogether. In the Copperbelt context, where reliability remains vital, diesel will continue to play a role. The objective is to reduce dependence on a single, volatile energy source. Hybridisation provides a practical pathway to achieve this. By integrating solar and, where viable, wind generation into existing energy systems, mines can significantly reduce fuel consumption while maintaining system stability.

This approach also enhances overall efficiency. Diesel generators operating alongside renewable energy sources can run at more consistent and optimal loads, reducing fuel consumption per kilowatt-hour and extending equipment lifespan. At the same time, the proportion of energy derived from fuel, unfortunately subject to global price volatility, is reduced, improving cost predictability. Research by the Rocky Mountain Institute highlights that hybrid renewable systems in mining applications can deliver both cost savings and improved operational performance when properly integrated (RMI, 2020).

For the Copperbelt, the case for solar integration is particularly strong. The region benefits from high levels of solar irradiation, making it well suited to large-scale PV deployment. The modular nature of solar installations allows mines to scale capacity in line with demand, while battery storage enables greater flexibility in managing load profiles and intermittency. Wind, although more site-specific, can further enhance system resilience where conditions permit.

Beyond cost and efficiency, energy diversification strengthens security of supply. By reducing reliance on diesel deliveries, mining operations become less exposed to logistical disruptions and geopolitical risks. This is particularly relevant in the DRC, where infrastructure constraints can complicate fuel transport. At the same time, the broader industry context is shifting. As global mining companies face increasing pressure to reduce emissions and align with decarbonisation goals, energy sourcing is becoming a central component of corporate strategy. Hybrid systems offer a practical and immediate pathway to lowering emissions intensity without compromising output (Bloomberg NEF, 2023).

Adoption is not without challenges. Renewable energy systems require upfront capital investment, and integrating hybrid solutions introduces a massive degree of technical complexity. Historically, these factors have slowed uptake. But we have to keep in mind that the landscape is evolving. Financing models such as power purchase agreements and energy-as-a-service structures are reducing the need for upfront capital, while advances in control systems are simplifying integration and improving reliability.

What is increasingly clear is that the status quo is no longer sustainable. Diesel, once the default solution to energy insecurity, is now a source of both cost pressure and operational risk. The current volatility in global fuel markets has simply accelerated a shift that was already underway.

For the Copperbelt, the implications are significant. As demand for its minerals continues to grow, so too will the importance of cost competitiveness and operational resilience. Energy sits at the centre of both. Mines that move decisively to diversify their energy mix stand to benefit from lower costs, greater stability and improved alignment with global market expectations. And those that do not may find themselves increasingly exposed to price shocks, supply disruptions and a rapidly shifting competitive landscape.

The Copperbelt is  defined by its resource wealth, but the next phase of advantage may not be determined solely by what lies beneath the ground, but by how effectively it is powered above it.

Zimbabwe is moving closer to formalising its upstream oil and gas framework, with a Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement (PPSA) between the government and Invictus Energy expected to be signed in April, a key step that could advance development of the country’s Cabora Bassa Basin project, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The agreement follows the completion of a final “all-party review,” according to Invictus Energy, and is set to establish the fiscal and legal foundation for petroleum exploration and production in Zimbabwe.

Once executed, the PPSA is expected to serve as a model contract for future investors entering the country’s hydrocarbons sector, effectively shaping the regulatory architecture of Zimbabwe’s emerging oil and gas industry.

The deal comes as Zimbabwe continues efforts to diversify its energy mix and reduce reliance on imported fuels and electricity, with policymakers increasingly viewing domestic gas resources as a potential long-term alternative for power generation and industrial supply.

Invictus Managing Director Scott Macmillan said the company is working closely with authorities as the agreement nears completion.

“We continue to work closely with the Government of Zimbabwe as the PPSA moves toward execution.

Establishing a strong and bankable petroleum industry regulatory framework is critical to unlocking the full value of the Cabora Bassa Project and the Mukuyu discovery.

We remain well-positioned to move forward rapidly following execution of the PPSA, with a clear pathway towards commercialisation and development, including relevant permits for an early production gas-to-power pilot project.”

Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube said the agreement reflects a deliberate effort to balance investor confidence with long-term national interests while ensuring alignment with international best practice.

“The Cabora Bassa Project represents a transformative opportunity for Zimbabwe’s energy sector and broader economy.

The additional time taken reflects a clear commitment to ensuring the agreement is robust, internationally competitive, and fully aligned with long-term sector development objectives.

The Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement reflects international best practice while safeguarding Zimbabwe’s long-term national interests and establishes a durable and investor-aligned framework,” Ncube said.

Invictus Energy has been at the centre of exploration activity in the Cabora Bassa Basin in northern Zimbabwe, where it has already reported significant gas-condensate discoveries at the Mukuyu prospect. The company is now preparing to move into appraisal and potential early development phases.

Execution of the PPSA would unlock the next stage of its work programme, including further appraisal of the Mukuyu gas field—following the Mukuyu-1 and Mukuyu-2 discoveries—and the drilling of the Musuma-1 exploration well in the eastern portion of the basin, which is designed to test a new geological play.

The company says the agreement is critical to enabling a clearer pathway toward commercialisation, including plans for an early production gas-to-power pilot project, which could provide initial output to support Zimbabwe’s power supply constraints.

Zimbabwe’s hydrocarbon potential remains largely underexplored, but interest in the Cabora Bassa Basin has increased following early discoveries that suggest the presence of commercially viable gas resources in the onshore basin.

If successfully executed and advanced to production, the project could mark one of the country’s most significant steps toward establishing a domestic natural gas industry, with potential implications for power generation, industrial energy supply, and import substitution.

For now, the April PPSA signing is being viewed as a critical gateway moment—determining how quickly Zimbabwe can transition from exploration success to commercial development in its upstream energy sector.

The Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (Zimcodd), a civil society organisation, has welcomed the government’s tightening of raw lithium export regulations, saying the reforms could help Zimbabwe retain more value from its mineral resources. However, the organisation cautioned that the success of the policy will depend on effective execution of the framework, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The response comes after the government strengthened its initial February ban on raw lithium exports by introducing a broader framework of conditions aimed at pushing mining companies toward local beneficiation and in-country processing.

The new measures are intended to curb the export of unprocessed lithium while compelling mining companies to invest in local processing and beneficiation, enabling Zimbabwe to capture more revenue from one of its most strategic minerals and improve transparency in the sector.

In a statement, Zimcodd said:
“The government has issued a framework of conditions that mining companies must meet before the ban can be lifted. Zimcodd views these conditions as a necessary and long-overdue step towards cleaning up a sector historically characterised by opacity, elite capture, and the quiet export of national wealth.”

The framework sets out a series of compliance requirements for mining firms, including obligations to establish beneficiation facilities capable of separating all economic minerals before export, as well as plans to develop lithium sulphate plants by January 2027 and install internationally accredited laboratories alongside on-site assay facilities within three months.

It also requires the full declaration of all minerals in export consignments and the publication of annual financial statements from December 2025.

In addition, export quotas will now be allocated on a producer-by-producer basis to control volumes, while companies must commit to improving worker welfare standards.

Authorities have further indicated that any future lithium investments will be assessed on a case-by-case basis under the new regulatory framework.

However, Zimcodd warned that the success of the framework will depend on effective execution and oversight.

“However, conditions on paper are not the same as conditions on the ground. The true test lies in implementation, oversight, and whether the benefits finally reach ordinary Zimbabweans, especially the women, youth, and rural communities who live in the shadows of the mines,” the organisation said.

Zimcodd said this is where the real test lies, stressing that the new framework will only make a difference if it is properly enforced and backed by strong oversight. The organisation added that what matters now is whether the policy shifts from paper into practice, and whether Zimbabwe’s lithium wealth begins to deliver visible benefits beyond the mining sector and into the wider economy.

• Zimbabwe Demands Captive Power for Chrome Smelters as Beneficiation Era Begins

To ensure the chrome beneficiation agenda aligns with national power generation realities, Zimbabwe has drawn a clear line in the sand: future smelting capacity will rise or fall on captive power, not the national grid, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

Vice President Dr Constantino Chiwenga, speaking at the Africa Chromium Week 2026 conference in Victoria Falls, delivered the government’s most definitive policy statement yet on the energy-industrial nexus. The message to global investors was unmistakable: Zimbabwe is serious about beneficiation, and that seriousness now extends to power.

“Critics questioned our smelting capacity and power supply when we reinstated the chrome ore export ban in 2022,” Chiwenga told delegates. “They doubted beneficiation was viable and predicted a policy reversal. We did not retreat. Instead, we invested and scaled capacity.”

Zimbabwe first introduced a chrome ore export ban in 2011 under Statutory Instrument 113, aimed at forcing local processing. The policy was inconsistently enforced, with exemptions granted and later revoked, creating uncertainty for miners. In 2022, the government reinstated the ban decisively, closing loopholes that had allowed raw chrome concentrates to leave the country. The current position, reiterated at the highest levels, is absolute: no raw chrome ore crosses Zimbabwe’s borders for export. All production must be beneficiated locally into ferrochrome or higher-value alloys.

The policy was met with scepticism. Industry players questioned whether Zimbabwe’s smelting capacity and power infrastructure could handle the increased load. Some predicted that miners would simply reduce output rather than invest in expensive smelting technology. Others warned that the ban would drive informal exports through neighbouring countries.

Instead, Zimbabwe invested.

Today, the country operates 17 ferrochrome smelters. In 2025, ferrochrome exports reached 433,293 metric tonnes, a 19% year-on-year surge. Zimbabwe now ranks fourth globally in chromite production and sixth in high-carbon ferrochrome. These are no longer aspirations. They are delivered results.

But the Vice President made it clear that the next phase of industrialisation requires a fundamental break from the past.

The Palm River Template

Vice President Chiwenga singled out the Palm River Energy Metallurgical Special Economic Zone as the model for Zimbabwe’s chrome-powered future. The US$3.6 billion project, which the government has fully endorsed, is not just a smelter; it is an integrated energy-industrial complex designed to solve the power problem at source.

“You want to process chrome at scale in Zimbabwe? Then you bring power to the party,” a senior ministry official familiar with the policy told Mining Zimbabwe, summarising the Vice President’s stance.

The Palm River zone will anchor a 2-million-tonnes-per-year ferrochrome smelter alongside a 1,200 MW power complex, a coking plant, and an integrated industrial park. It is projected to create 10,000 direct jobs and position Zimbabwe among the world’s largest ferrochrome producers.

For the 17 existing smelters and any new entrants, the template is now the target. Captive generation, whether through dedicated coal, waste heat recovery, solar, or gas, is no longer a competitive advantage. It is a licence to operate.

What the Industry Is Saying

The policy direction aligns with broader global trends. Shiraz Neffati, Executive Director of the International Chromium Development Association (ICDA), told the same conference that the chromium industry’s future depends on more than just ore quality.

“For the chromium industry to thrive, it needs perfect alignment between political stability, access to reliable and cost-effective energy, and green energy,” Neffati said.

She also emphasised chromium’s growing strategic importance. “Chromium is set to be a critical raw material for several jurisdictions because it is an enabler in several applications: stainless steel, speciality steel, defence, aerospace, energy, engineering, and new technology. If you don’t have Chromium, these applications cannot exist.”

Neffati’s remarks underscore the opportunity before Zimbabwe. As chromium gains critical raw material status globally, countries that can supply processed material from stable, energy-secure jurisdictions will capture premium market access, particularly as Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) rewards cleaner production.

Why This Is a Real Deal

Zimbabwe is not bluffing. The chrome ore export ban remains firmly in force. The government has shown it will enforce beneficiation. And now, with the Palm River model, it has demonstrated what success looks like.

The timing aligns with a generational shift in global chromium demand. China’s industrial expansion continues to anchor consumption. India is emerging as the next major frontier for stainless steel. Europe’s CBAM is redefining trade flows to reward cleaner, more efficient production.

Zimbabwe, with the world’s second-largest chrome reserves and a policy framework now anchored on energy-integrated beneficiation, is positioning itself to capture value at every level, not just digging ore and shipping it out.

Dr. Chiwenga’s address was not a plea for investment. It was an invitation to partner on Zimbabwe’s terms. The country has the ore, it has the policy, and now, through projects like Palm River, it is building the power to process it all.

“We have moved from defending our policy to demonstrating its results,” the Vice President said. “What comes next is scale.”

Zimbabwe is no longer asking whether it can beneficiate its chrome. It is showing how. The answer, according to the country’s second-highest office, is power integrated, dedicated, and built alongside every major smelter.