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State Lease Looted: Botha Mine Faces US$40M Claim

Documents, court rulings, government suspension orders, and a sworn affidavit from the Ministry of Mines paint a picture of systematic encroachment, violence, and alleged theft from a Mutapa Investment Fund asset. New estimates value the gold taken from State ground at US$40 million.

For more than three years, a corporate battle has raged underground in Bindura’s gold fields. At its centre is Mining Lease 21, a 1,585-hectare registered title held by Freda Rebecca Gold Mine, an asset of the state-owned Mutapa Investment Fund’s Mutapa Gold Resources. On the other side is Side Electrical (Private) Limited, trading as Botha Mine, whose directors include Themba Hlongwani, reportedly a shareholder and the Managing Director of Botha Gold Mine.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

Multiple court orders, Environmental Management Agency suspensions, and a Mining Inspectorate shutdown confirm that Botha Mine has been operating far beyond its legal boundaries. Its former General Manager, Angel Mpofu-Chisvo, who was owed a US$1.2 million debt by Botha Gold Mine, is now the Project Manager of Navid Incorporated Pvt Ltd, the company mandated to protect Freda Rebecca’s Phoenix Prince Mine, the area encroached upon by Botha Mine within Freda Rebecca’s Mining Lease 21. Regulators have ordered a complete halt, but sources say Botha Mine continues to “loot” the State lease, and a coordinated effort is underway to stop what one insider called “a horrible crime brewing at Freda Rebecca’s lease.” Newly filed sworn papers from the Ministry of Mines now put a figure on the alleged theft: approximately 271 kilograms of gold, valued at US$40 million, unlawfully taken from State resources.

The Lease: Never Abandoned, Always Paid

Botha Mine has publicly suggested that Freda Rebecca abandoned Mining Lease 21 in 2001, claiming the title lapsed. Documents contradict that narrative entirely. Survey Diagram SG1845/1994 defines the lease boundaries and has never been altered, noting that Freda Rebecca Gold Mine is located within Mining Lease 21. Receipts from the Ministry of Mines prove continuous annual fee payments from 1994 to 2026; a January 2022 invoice (No. 045762) shows Freda Rebecca paid US$4,041,750.00 as an inspection fee for Lease 21. Under the Mines and Minerals Act, abandonment requires formal cancellation by the Mining Affairs Board; no such application or resolution exists. A 2015 High Court judgment (HH 839-15) that Botha has cited in the past dealt with employee housing evictions, not lease abandonment; the court explicitly found that Ashanti Goldfields (Freda Rebecca’s predecessor) had surrendered residential areas, not the mining lease itself. Freda Rebecca’s title is valid, registered, and fully compliant with Zimbabwe’s Computerised Mining Cadastre System.

Ministry of Mines Sworn Affidavit Sets Record Straight

In a dramatic development, the Provincial Mining Director for Mashonaland Central, Tendai Kashiri, has filed a sworn affidavit as the 2nd Respondent in High Court proceedings. The affidavit, submitted on behalf of the Minister of Mines, the Secretary for Mines, and the Mining Commissioner, clarifies the status of mining rights once and for all. The Ministry states that it is not opposing Freda Rebecca’s application but is placing the correct facts on record.

According to the affidavit, Mining Lease 21 measures 1,586 hectares and is “current and in good standing, as evidenced by the inspection certificates on page 31 of the record.” The Ministry confirms that General Notice 651 of 2002, which published an application to reduce the lease, was never authorised by the Mining Affairs Board. “Crucially, there is no record of the Mining Affairs Board ever proceeding to authorise the decrease of Mining Lease 21. Consequently, the Ministry has continued to receive and process inspection certificates for the original 1,586ha to date. The lease remains legally valid in its full original extent.”

Regarding Botha Mine, the affidavit states that Side Electrical holds four certificates of registration: Botha 1 (10ha), Botha 2 (8ha), Botha 3 (4ha), and Botha 4 (9ha), covering a total of 31 hectares.

“We confirm that the 1st Respondent has never acquired mining rights within the boundaries of Mining Lease 21, whether in its original form or the area designated for intended abandonment. The only certificates granting mining rights to the 1st Respondent are the four Botha certificates.” The affidavit concludes that “the 1st Respondent’s title is strictly limited to Botha 1–4, covering 31ha. This title does not include any portion of Mining Lease 21.”

Gold Trade Act Violation and US$40 Million Claim

Because the two titles are separate and distinct, any mining by Botha inside Mining Lease 21 is not merely a civil trespass but a statutory offence. The Provincial Mining Director states:

“The 1st Respondent is legally prohibited from interfering with the Applicant’s mining title and operations. Any mining activity conducted by the 1st Respondent within the Applicant’s Mining Lease 21 would constitute mining outside their registered boundaries, which amounts to a violation of Section 5 of the Gold Trade Act [Chapter 21:03].”

The financial implications for the State are staggering. According to a summary note prepared by the Ministry and seen by this publication, Mutapa Gold Resources estimates that approximately 271 kilograms of gold, valued at US$40 million, was unlawfully collected from State ground by Botha Mine. The note states that this raises serious tax issues with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority and that Freda Rebecca is now pursuing recovery of that amount, together with outstanding royalties. A senior official familiar with the filing said: “The State’s position is now clear and on oath. Mining Lease 21 belongs to Freda Rebecca Gold Mine in full. There is no dual mandate. Any party operating inside ML21 without FRGM’s consent is in breach of the Gold Trade Act.”

Encroachment: 36 Hectares vs. 160 Hectares

Botha Mine holds registered claims for only 36 hectares, known as Botha 1 to 4, with an Environmental Impact Assessment certificate covering precisely that area. Yet a survey office note dated 30 December 2025, attached to court records, states plainly:

“Shaft number 1 is falling within an area which overlaps Direct Mining and Botha 3… The other three shafts are falling in an area shown as Botha 2, which is overlapping with Freda Rebecca Mining Lease 21.”

In other words, Botha has illegally expanded onto approximately 160 hectares of Mining Lease 21, including the area called Phoenix Prince Mine, where Botha established a gold processing plant. Freda Rebecca documented its complaints to the Provincial Mining Director and police as early as 2018. Botha was issued a notice of cancellation of its claims in 2018, yet the encroachment continued.

Courts Speak: Peace Order, Dismissal, and Spoliation Clarified

Botha Mine has waved a spoliation order (HC 653/26) as proof of its right to occupy. According to sources, that is a deliberate misreading of the law. A spoliation order (mandament van spolie) restores possession, not ownership; it merely prevents someone from taking the law into their own hands. The order referred only to nicknames like “Gwiringwindi, Headgear, Morocco and GMB,” none of which are registered mining locations. It did not validate occupation of Lease 21.

Far more decisive are two rulings. First, on 27 March 2026, the Bindura Magistrates Court issued a provisional order stating:

“The 1st and 2nd Respondents, their agents, contractors, and proxies mining within an area commonly known as Kitsiyatota… be and are hereby ordered to forthwith stop all mining and mining-related activities until the 3rd Respondent has shown the 2nd Respondent… the extent that the 2nd Respondent’s EIA certificate applies.”

That order was confirmed on 15 April 2026, with Magistrate R. Chitumbura directing that “the 1st and 2nd respondents be and are hereby ordered to maintain peace by conforming to their registered boundaries, being Mining Lease 21 or Phoenix Prince Mine for the 1st respondent and Botha 1 to 4 for the 2nd respondent.”

The Zimbabwe Republic Police in Bindura were ordered to ensure compliance, and costs were awarded against Botha.

Second, on 13 April 2026, the High Court dismissed Botha’s urgent application (case HCH1681/26) with costs after Botha failed to appear. Justice Muremba’s ruling added to a string of legal defeats. In a notice of appeal filed on 3 March 2026, Freda Rebecca’s lawyers had already argued that the spoliation order “erred and grossly misdirected itself… in circumstances where the 1st Respondent failed to establish actual and definitive proof of peaceful and undisturbed possession” and that the order “effectively determines the parties’ respective rights to occupy and conduct mining operations… which area falls within the Appellant’s Mining Lease Number 21.”

Government Shutdown: EMA and Mines Inspectorate Act

Regulators have moved forcefully. On 3 April 2026, the Environmental Management Agency ordered Guilder Treasures, a processing plant operating at Botha Mine, to cease and decommission for operating without a valid EIA and using VAT leaching across 90 tanks and six boilers. On 9 April 2026, EMA issued a second suspension order requiring Botha to stop all operations outside its approved coordinates, citing “unlicensed land disturbance, water contamination, and vegetation clearing without an EIA.” On 8 April 2026, the Provincial Mining Engineer suspended all mining at Botha Mine and adjoining areas under Lease 21, citing “violence, unauthorised access, safety breakdowns, and obstruction of regulators.” Police subsequently cleared illegal miners from Lease 21. All suspension orders remain in force. The Herald reported on Botha’s “ambitious court battle” and the company’s attempt to block police investigations; that application was struck off by Justice Samuel Deme in January 2026, who ruled that Botha had confused an interdict with a stay of execution.

The Human Story: Angel Mpofu-Chisvo — A Formidable Force from General Manager to Victorious Project Manager

Perhaps the most revealing document is a “Full and Final Mutual Employment Termination Agreement” signed in September 2025 between Side Electrical and Angel Mpofu-Chisvo, who had served as Botha Mine’s General Manager until 30 September 2025. The agreement states: “The Employer acknowledges an outstanding debt of USD 1,200,000 (One Million Two Hundred Thousand United States Dollars) to the Employee for unpaid back salaries and benefits.”

A settlement of US$1.125 million was agreed, “payable in gold ore,” specifically 13,000 tonnes from eight designated shafts with coordinates attached to the agreement. Ms Chisvo left the company because, according to the narrative provided to this publication, Botha Mine was encroaching onto Freda Rebecca’s side—a move she could not support. She has not been accused of any wrongdoing.

In fact, a separate High Court judgment (HH 783-25) confirms that she and her business partner and sister, Lindiwe Mpofu (through their companies McPern Investments and Laird Enterprises), obtained a spoliation order against Side Electrical after being unlawfully locked out of their shafts. The court found that the opposing affidavit filed by Botha was sworn by a person without authority, stating:

“The virtual meeting held by Augustin Manyau and Stanley Marine on 17 November 2025 is null and void. Their resolution to appoint Evelyn Mhlanga to act for the respondent was equally null and void. So too is the opposing affidavit… The net effect is that, since there are no valid opposing papers before me, the application is unopposed.”

The court granted the order in their favour.

Today, Freda Rebecca and its project manager, Navid Incorporated, have appointed Ms Angel Mpofu-Chisvo as Project Manager of Navid Incorporated, while her sister, Lindiwe Mpofu, former Vice President of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation and current Vice President of the Business Economic and Empowerment Federation, has been reinstated to her shafts within Phoenix Prince Mine.

Premier Targets Lithium Export Restart as Soft Lifting of Export Ban

Premier African Minerals Limited says it is preparing to resume lithium concentrate exports after the Government of Zimbabwe signalled a shift from a blanket ban to a controlled quota-based system for producers, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The expected restart follows recent moves by authorities to grant export quotas to selected lithium miners, marking a policy adjustment after February’s suspension of lithium concentrate shipments, including cargo already in transit, as part of efforts to drive in-country beneficiation.

The ban formed part of a broader push to capture more value from Zimbabwe’s lithium resources, amid concerns that the country has been exporting raw material at significantly discounted prices while downstream processors earn substantially higher returns.

Lithium concentrates from Zimbabwe have typically fetched about US$375 per tonne, compared to more than US$20,000 per tonne for refined products on international markets, highlighting the scale of value leakage authorities are seeking to address.

Premier said ongoing engagement with regulators has now clarified the path toward a phased resumption of exports.

“The company notes recent developments in Zimbabwe’s lithium export policy following the government’s February 2026 decision to suspend exports of lithium concentrates and other raw minerals in order to promote in-country beneficiation and address regulatory concerns,” the company said.

“Subsequent industry engagement and regulatory clarification indicate that exports are expected to resume under a controlled framework, with approvals and quotas being granted to qualifying producers that meet specified criteria, including compliance with local processing and regulatory requirements.”

Under the revised framework, producers must commit to beneficiation investments, including plans to separate all economic minerals before export, develop lithium sulphate plants by January 2027, and install internationally accredited laboratories and on-site assay facilities within three months.

They are also required to fully declare mineral content in export consignments and publish financial statements starting December 2025.

Premier said it supports the policy direction, describing it as a pragmatic balance between enforcing value addition and sustaining sector activity.

Alongside the regulatory developments, the company is reinforcing operations at its Zulu Lithium and Tantalum Project after raising approximately £750,000 through a share issue in London.

The funding is being deployed to maintain operational momentum as the project moves from construction toward commissioning, while supporting installation and integration of the flotation plant—a critical component of the processing circuit.

Zulu remains central to Premier’s growth strategy in the lithium sector, with recent progress focused on the Xinhai flotation plant, which is designed to upgrade ore by separating spodumene from waste minerals such as quartz and feldspar.

Installation work has advanced in recent weeks, with site-based fabrication of piping, walkways, and flotation infrastructure being carried out by the project team under specialist supervision, positioning the operation for improved concentrate quality ahead of export resumption.

Mining Leads as Mutapa Investment Fund Unveils $1bn+ 2026 Deal Pipeline

Mining will anchor a more than $1 billion deal pipeline lined up for execution in 2026 by the Mutapa Investment Fund, as the sovereign fund steps up efforts to mobilise capital and build recurring income streams, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The pipeline, disclosed by Chief Investment Officer Simba Chinyemba alongside the fund’s FY2025 audited financial results, comprises four key transactions: a $75 million domestic syndicated mining facility, a $400 million commodity offtake and throughput structured financing arrangement, over $500 million in energy-related projects, and a $100 million rail financing facility.

Chinyemba said the transactions are advanced and execution-ready.

The $75 million mining syndication is expected to be raised from domestic lenders, including commercial banks, pension funds, and development finance institutions, to support expansion across the minerals portfolio. The facility is structured to distribute credit risk among multiple participants while positioning Mutapa as a local capital mobilisation anchor.

The mining cluster remains central to the fund’s strategy, with assets under Kuvimba Mining House recording significant valuation growth during the year, supported by firm gold prices and the restructuring of operations into commodity-focused verticals.

In parallel, the fund is pursuing a $400 million commodity offtake and throughput financing structure tied to mineral production. The arrangement is designed to secure funding against future output through contracted delivery agreements with international commodity buyers, trading houses, and potential sovereign counterparties.

The pipeline also includes more than $500 million in energy investments spanning power generation, transmission infrastructure, and renewable energy projects, as well as a $100 million financing facility for the National Railways of Zimbabwe to support rail network rehabilitation.

According to the fund, the transactions form part of a broader strategy to strengthen income generation and crowd in external capital, with Mutapa acting as a sovereign anchor investor rather than the sole funding source.

Financial results for the year reflect continued asset growth but a relatively modest earnings base. Total assets rose to $16.5 billion from $14.9 billion, driven largely by $1.37 billion in fair value gains on the investment portfolio. The fund reported a surplus of $21.7 million on total income of $60.3 million.

Mutapa closed the year with $9.9 million in cash and $43.7 million in liquid assets, underscoring its reliance on external capital mobilisation to fund the pipeline.

‘We Are Paying 40% of Our Sales to Government’, Lithium Producers Open Up on Crushing Tax Burden

As Arcadia’s US$400 million plant is completed, Bikita builds a caesium facility, and Kamativi recovers tin, miners say the fiscal regime needs to evolve with the industry.

The lithium sector is the jewel of Zimbabwe’s beneficiation agenda. Six large-scale producers have invested billions. Processing plants are rising. Export quotas have been granted. The government’s 2027 deadline for local processing is approaching.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

But beneath the headlines, a quieter story is unfolding. Lithium producers say they are being crushed by a tax burden that consumes nearly 40 percent of their sales, leaving little room for the very investments the government demands.

“We are paying 40 percent of our sales to the government,” one producer told Mining Zimbabwe. “We try our best to contribute, but we feel we are treated badly.”

This is not an attack on policy. It is a plea for partnership. And if both sides listen, the outcome could be billions more for the Treasury and a sustainable, thriving lithium industry.

The Arithmetic of Survival

Let us break down the numbers.

When a lithium producer sells a tonne of concentrate, the government takes:

• 10% unbeneficiated export tax on gross fair market value
• 7% royalty on lithium sales
• 3% community development levy on lithium sales
• 1% MMCZ marketing fee
• 15.5% VAT on applicable transactions
• Foreign currency retention requirements that effectively tax export earnings

Add corporate income tax, payroll taxes, and various other levies, and the total approaches 40 percent of sales revenue.

This is before operational costs. Before equipment. Before labour. Before power. Before maintenance.

“They will make sure operational costs are covered,” the producer said. “But after that, there is not much left.”

The Permit Crisis: Starting Over

Compounding the financial pressure is administrative uncertainty.

Several producers reported that their MMCZ export papers had been cancelled without clear guidance on how to proceed.

“We are not sure now whether we will start the whole process again or resume with the previous papers,” one miner said. “When we did everything right, our papers were cancelled anyway.”

The uncertainty creates delays. Delays create costs. Costs add to the 40 percent burden.

The Rare Earth Question: Government Loses Too

Producers are keenly aware that the government’s aggressive tax regime may be self-defeating.

If by-minerals such as tantalum, niobium, and caesium are not declared because it is not economically viable to separate them under the current fiscal framework, the government loses revenue on those minerals as well.

“If it’s viable, the rare earth within the products, the government also loses,” the producer said. “They missed the good window of good prices.”

Research presented by NUST lecturer Eng Mudono at a recent ZELO breakfast meeting estimated that Zimbabwe lost approximately US$400 million in unreported tantalum and US$30 million in unreported caesium from lithium concentrate exports.

That is government revenue that never reached the Treasury. That is value that left the country without a cent paid.

The Arcadia Example: Africa’s First Lithium Sulphate Plant

Among the three major processing facilities reshaping Zimbabwe’s lithium sector, Arcadia Lithium Mine stands out as the most advanced.

Operated by Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, a subsidiary of China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Arcadia has built a US$400 million lithium sulphate processing plant, the first of its kind in Africa and only the third globally.

The facility, located in Goromonzi, Mashonaland East Province, has reached its equipment commissioning phase and is expected to begin production in the first quarter of 2026. The plant has a design capacity of approximately 60,000 tonnes of lithium sulphate per annum.

According to PLZ General Manager Henry Zhu, the plant’s three production lines will process 500,000 tonnes of concentrate annually, converting it to around 80,000 tonnes of lithium sulphate.

“The lithium sulphate plant is a game-changer for our economy,” Zhu stated. “Not only has this plant created jobs and stimulated local economic activity, but it also showcases Zimbabwe’s potential as a major player in the global lithium market.”

The economic implications are already being felt. Beyond the capital investment, the plant’s construction has created numerous employment opportunities for residents of Goromonzi District, with further hiring expected upon operational launch.

Prospect expects to more than double its revenue once the plant comes into production, demonstrating the compelling economics of local processing.

The Bikita and Kamativi Examples: Market Decisions, Not Defiance

The government should take note of what is already happening across the sector.

Bikita Minerals, under its Chinese parent company Sinomine Resource Group, has built the world’s first caesium flotation plant, a US$35 million investment that extracts caesium from petalite tailings. Sinomine has also announced plans for a US$400 million smelting facility to produce battery-grade lithium hydroxide or carbonate.

Kamativi Mining Company is currently constructing a tin, tantalum, and niobium recovery system, expected to commence operations in September 2026.

These were not reactions to government pressure. They were market decisions. Bikita saw an opportunity to extract additional value from its tailings. Kamativi recognised that its pegmatites contain multiple economic minerals worth recovering.

“Bikita did it for market-based decisions,” the producer explained. “When lithium is good, we focus. It was a market decision.”

The lesson is that miners are not enemies of the state. They are businesses responding to price signals, operational constraints, and investment horizons. When the economics work, they invest.

The Laboratory Solution: A Network Already Being Built

One of the most practical steps the government could take is already underway.

On 14 April 2026, Cabinet approved the National Minerals Research and Analytical Scientific Laboratory Infrastructure Pillar, establishing a decentralised network of specialised analytical hubs at nine universities and scientific institutions across the country.

The University of Zimbabwe will serve as the apex hub for lithium, rare earth elements, and uranium. The National University of Science and Technology and Great Zimbabwe University will anchor platinum group metals and battery minerals. Midlands State University will provide analytical oversight for iron ore, chrome, and vanadium corridors.

“Government will end the costly and risky reliance on foreign laboratories for mineral certification through a decentralised network of specialised analytical hubs co-located at national universities and scientific institutions,” Information Minister Hon Zhemu Soda announced.

But a network of laboratories is only useful if it is used. The government must ensure these facilities are equipped, staffed, and funded to test every export consignment for all economic minerals present. The results should serve as the basis for taxation—not self-declaration, not trust, but empirical data.

If the government tests and finds tantalum, tax tantalum. If it finds caesium, tax caesium. If it finds rare earths, tax rare earths. The laboratory network gives the government the evidence it needs to capture value from every mineral in every concentrate.

The Infant Industry Argument

The lithium sector in Zimbabwe is, by any honest measure, brand new.

Before 2021, commercial lithium production was negligible. The current wave of investment has occurred almost entirely in the last four years. The sector is not a mature, cash-rich industry ready for heavy taxation. It is a newborn, still finding its feet, still building the plants that will one day deliver the beneficiation the government seeks.

“The sector is young,” the producer said. “The investment that the government now requires from us is heavy. This was supposed to be the first step, before the taxes, before the heavy demands.”

Between 2020 and 2025, Zimbabwe’s raw lithium exports surged from about US$7 million to nearly US$600 million. That is one of the fastest growth trajectories in the country’s mining history. But the export ban has now halted that momentum mid-flight.

Industry sources say Zimbabwe could be losing as much as US$60 million monthly in royalties and taxes following the indefinite ban. The five largest producers, employing about 9,000 workers, have scaled down operations and are largely mining to stockpile ore—a stopgap strategy that buys time but offers little certainty.

“At the moment, we are only stockpiling since the ban came into play. Costs of production are rising by the day,” a source said. “It is uncertain if firms will preserve jobs.”

Geology Abandoned for Processing

One of the most persistent gaps in Zimbabwe’s mining sector is the absence of comprehensive geological research. NDS2 identified exploration and geological data as priorities, but the funding has not followed.

“So much money is going to processing, and geology is abandoned,” the producer said. “The government should see this. The resource, is it good for that? Is there enough to do exploration?”

Without knowing what is in the ground, the country cannot attract the right investors. Without the right investors, the beneficiation agenda cannot succeed. Without success, the tax revenues will never materialise.

“The government should create an environment to encourage miners to produce rather than force them,” the producer said.

The One-Plant Problem

The government’s expectation that every producer build its own lithium sulphate plant is economically unrealistic.

“Having one plant for all miners is difficult. For all miners, it is not economical,” the producer said.

The solution, already working in the PGMs sector, is toll processing. Smaller miners send their concentrate to larger producers with excess capacity. Zimplats processes concentrate for Mimosa. The same model could work for lithium.

But the fiscal regime must recognise this reality. Forcing every producer to build its own plant, when the economics do not support it, is not a beneficiation strategy. It is a recipe for stranded assets.

The 11 Conditions: A Framework, Not a Final Word

The government has made progress. The 11 conditions issued by Mines Minister Hon Dr Eng Polite Kambamura on 7 April 2026 include mandatory declaration of all minerals before export and the establishment of assay laboratories at each producing mine within three months.

These conditions target the very practices that created the pricing gap. Financial transparency ends transfer pricing. Assay laboratories end under-declaration. Beneficiation requirements end the export of raw material altogether.

But a condition is not implementation. A laboratory is not a policy. The missing link is a fiscal regime that recognises the reality of an infant industry.

What Needs to Happen: A Partnership Approach

The producers are not asking for a free ride. They are asking for a fiscal regime that recognises the reality of an infant industry and creates a genuine partnership between government and miners.

“We are willing to follow government rules, but sometimes some processes should fund themselves,” the producer said.

Kavango Resources plc says its long-delayed acquisition of the Nara Gold Project in Zimbabwe is now nearing completion, marking a potential breakthrough after months of regulatory and administrative setbacks, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The Victoria Falls Stock Exchange-listed miner confirmed it has signed a Deed of Variation (DoV) with the seller, clarifying the final steps required to conclude the transaction under the original call option agreement signed in June 2023.

Kavango exercised the option in July 2025 to acquire 100% of the 45-claim project, but completion has repeatedly slipped as the parties worked through Zimbabwe’s mining title transfer requirements.

The process, which requires approval from the Mining Commissioner and verification that each claim complies with statutory obligations such as fees, minimum work requirements, and environmental standards, pushed initial deadlines from December 2025 to February 2026, then into March, before being left open-ended.

In an update on the transaction, the company said it has now resolved key outstanding issues around the structure and execution of the deal, signalling that completion is close.

“…Kavango and the Seller have signed a Deed of Variation in respect of the call option agreement dated 23 June 2023, to address the mechanics of completion, which we anticipate occurring shortly. Kavango has transferred the balance of the consideration into an escrow account to be transferred to the Seller upon completion of the final documentation.

The parties are currently discussing the possible sale and purchase of the operating company, Romjack Mining (Pvt) Ltd, so that Kavango can seamlessly continue the current operations at Nara,” the company said.

Executive Chairman and Interim CEO Peter Wynter Bee said the company is positioning itself to integrate the asset into its broader Zimbabwean portfolio.

“We are excited to be embarking on the Nara project. The Company is committed to building upon the success of the Nara Gold Project for the benefit of its shareholders and the local community,” he said.

He added that Kavango is evaluating the co-location of its exploration team to improve efficiency and support development across its projects.

For a multi-claim asset like Nara, the administrative burden has proven significant, reflecting wider capacity constraints within the system.

Kavango has consistently maintained that both parties remain committed to closing the transaction. The latest update suggests the deal is now entering its final phase, with the company confirming it has placed the remaining purchase consideration into an escrow account, to be released once final documentation is completed.

The Nara acquisition is central to Kavango’s strategy to transition into a gold producer, providing near-term cash flow to underpin its wider exploration portfolio. The prolonged delays have also underscored the extent to which administrative processes in Zimbabwe can influence deal timelines, even where commercial terms are already agreed.

Caledonia maintains full-year guidance of 72,000–76,500 ounces, expects stronger second-half performance as operational initiatives take effect

Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc has announced that gold production at its Blanket Mine in Gwanda fell to 14,767 ounces in the first quarter of 2026, representing a 20.9% decrease from the 18,671 ounces produced in the first quarter of 2025, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The decline also marks a 15.0% drop from the fourth quarter of 2025, when Blanket produced 17,367 ounces. The Q4 2025 figure itself represented a 12.5% decrease from 19,841 ounces in the same period of 2024, underscoring a trend of operational headwinds that began in the second half of last year.

Caledonia stated that the lower quarterly result was anticipated, reflecting mining sequence and anticipated access constraints to higher-grade, higher-volume areas. Production during the quarter was also impacted by equipment availability issues and challenging ground conditions.

“The challenges experienced in the first quarter do not reflect the underlying quality of the orebody or the long-term fundamentals of the operation,” said Mark Learmonth, Chief Executive Officer of Caledonia.

Despite the weaker start to the year, the company remains comfortable with Blanket’s full-year production guidance of 72,000 to 76,500 ounces. Caledonia had previously stated in its March 23, 2026 announcement that production is expected to be weighted towards the second half of the year as operational initiatives take effect.

Several measures are being implemented to address the production constraints:

A new mine shift system, currently being implemented, will increase mine production from six to seven days per week and is expected to reduce worker fatigue while supporting increased ore production.

A contractor has been appointed to accelerate access to higher-grade ore sources, addressing the grade constraints that affected both Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.

An additional ball mill was commissioned in the second quarter of 2026, increasing milling capacity. Plant performance remained strong during the quarter, with 202,217 tonnes milled and good operational availability across the processing circuit.

“Pleasingly, plant performance remained strong, with 202,217 tonnes milled and good operational availability across the processing circuit. This is an important reflection of our continued investment in the future of the processing facility,” Learmonth noted.

The production challenges in recent quarters stand in contrast to Caledonia’s strong financial performance for the full year 2025. The company reported revenue of US$267 million, a 46% increase from the prior year, while profit after tax surged 193% to US$67.5 million. The significant profit growth was driven primarily by a higher gold price environment, with realised gold prices rising 55% to US$4,057 per ounce in Q4 2025.

Blanket produced 76,213 ounces for the full year 2025, meeting increased guidance of 75,500 to 79,500 ounces and remaining nearly identical to the prior two years.

Beyond Blanket, Caledonia continues to advance its larger-scale Bilboes gold project. In February 2026, the company appointed Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe and CBZ Bank Limited as co-lead arrangers for an interim funding facility of up to US$150 million, forming part of a four-part funding strategy to develop what will become Zimbabwe’s largest gold mine.

Once operational, Bilboes is forecast to reach a steady annual output of 200,000 ounces from 2029 for an initial period of 10 years, with first production scheduled for late 2028. The company owns 100% of Bilboes, compared to a 64% stake in Blanket Mine.