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Caledonia maintains full-year guidance of 72,000–76,500 ounces, expects stronger second-half performance as operational initiatives take effect

Caledonia Mining Corporation Plc has announced that gold production at its Blanket Mine in Gwanda fell to 14,767 ounces in the first quarter of 2026, representing a 20.9% decrease from the 18,671 ounces produced in the first quarter of 2025, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The decline also marks a 15.0% drop from the fourth quarter of 2025, when Blanket produced 17,367 ounces. The Q4 2025 figure itself represented a 12.5% decrease from 19,841 ounces in the same period of 2024, underscoring a trend of operational headwinds that began in the second half of last year.

Caledonia stated that the lower quarterly result was anticipated, reflecting mining sequence and anticipated access constraints to higher-grade, higher-volume areas. Production during the quarter was also impacted by equipment availability issues and challenging ground conditions.

“The challenges experienced in the first quarter do not reflect the underlying quality of the orebody or the long-term fundamentals of the operation,” said Mark Learmonth, Chief Executive Officer of Caledonia.

Despite the weaker start to the year, the company remains comfortable with Blanket’s full-year production guidance of 72,000 to 76,500 ounces. Caledonia had previously stated in its March 23, 2026 announcement that production is expected to be weighted towards the second half of the year as operational initiatives take effect.

Several measures are being implemented to address the production constraints:

A new mine shift system, currently being implemented, will increase mine production from six to seven days per week and is expected to reduce worker fatigue while supporting increased ore production.

A contractor has been appointed to accelerate access to higher-grade ore sources, addressing the grade constraints that affected both Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.

An additional ball mill was commissioned in the second quarter of 2026, increasing milling capacity. Plant performance remained strong during the quarter, with 202,217 tonnes milled and good operational availability across the processing circuit.

“Pleasingly, plant performance remained strong, with 202,217 tonnes milled and good operational availability across the processing circuit. This is an important reflection of our continued investment in the future of the processing facility,” Learmonth noted.

The production challenges in recent quarters stand in contrast to Caledonia’s strong financial performance for the full year 2025. The company reported revenue of US$267 million, a 46% increase from the prior year, while profit after tax surged 193% to US$67.5 million. The significant profit growth was driven primarily by a higher gold price environment, with realised gold prices rising 55% to US$4,057 per ounce in Q4 2025.

Blanket produced 76,213 ounces for the full year 2025, meeting increased guidance of 75,500 to 79,500 ounces and remaining nearly identical to the prior two years.

Beyond Blanket, Caledonia continues to advance its larger-scale Bilboes gold project. In February 2026, the company appointed Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe and CBZ Bank Limited as co-lead arrangers for an interim funding facility of up to US$150 million, forming part of a four-part funding strategy to develop what will become Zimbabwe’s largest gold mine.

Once operational, Bilboes is forecast to reach a steady annual output of 200,000 ounces from 2029 for an initial period of 10 years, with first production scheduled for late 2028. The company owns 100% of Bilboes, compared to a 64% stake in Blanket Mine.

Zimbabwe’s beneficiation and value addition agenda is the most ambitious industrial policy the country has undertaken in a generation. The 25 February 2026 ban on raw mineral exports, the 11 conditions for lithium producers, and the new mineral value chain framework approved by Cabinet all point in one direction: Zimbabwe will no longer export raw minerals. It will process them here.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

But there is a problem. A quiet problem. A problem that nobody is talking about at Cabinet briefings or investor conferences.

Beneficiation needs supply. Processing plants need spare parts. Concentrators need consumables. Refineries need maintenance. And right now, the supply chain that is supposed to support this industrial revolution is broken.

Let me take you through what I have learned, piece by piece.

The Price Gap Is a Barrier to Beneficiation

Let me start with a story.

A few weeks ago, I was talking to a miner who is building a processing plant. He showed me his budget. It was detailed. It was professional. It had line items for everything, except one thing.

I asked him about the equipment. Where was he buying it from? He looked at me like I had asked a silly question.

“China,” he said. “Where else?”

I asked him why not buy locally. He laughed.

“Let me give you an example. There is a piece of equipment that costs US$1,000 in China. The same equipment, from a local supplier here, costs US$3,800. Sometimes US$4,000. Same brand. Same product. Three to four times more expensive.”

He told me that even after shipping, import duties, and all the paperwork, it is still cheaper to bring it from China than to buy it from a supplier in Harare.

“I want to support local businesses. I really do. But I cannot pay four times the price. My shareholders would fire me. My investors would pull out. The math does not work.”

This is not a small problem. This is the problem.

The government wants miners to build processing plants. But building a plant requires equipment. And equipment in Zimbabwe costs three to four times more than it does in China. So miners import. And when miners import, local suppliers lose. When local suppliers lose, local manufacturing capacity shrinks. When local manufacturing capacity shrinks, the beneficiation agenda becomes dependent on foreign supply chains.

And a beneficiation agenda dependent on foreign supply chains is not sustainable. It is not industrialisation. It is a substitution.

Even Basic Consumables Are Hard to Find

The problem is not just about expensive equipment. It is about the absence of basic consumables that mines need every single day.

I visited another mine. This one was already operational. The maintenance manager walked me through his workshop. He pointed to a truck that was not moving.

“That truck has been sitting there for ten days,” he said, “waiting for a part.”

I asked him what part. He showed me. It was not complicated. It was not high-tech. It was a basic component that any mining operation needs.

“I called every supplier in Harare. Nothing. I called Bulawayo. Nothing. I called Gweru. Nothing. I ended up ordering from South Africa.”

Ten days waiting. Ten days of a truck idle. Ten days of lost production.

“Now imagine this happens to a lithium sulphate plant,” he said. “Imagine we are processing high-value material and a pump fails. If I cannot get a replacement fast, the whole operation stops. That is not just lost time. That is lost revenue. Lots of it.”

He told me that even for basic consumables—filters, belts, bearings—the local market is thin, sometimes nonexistent.

“We want to buy local. I am tired of importing everything. But local suppliers often do not have what we need. So we wait or we pay premium prices. Neither is good for business.”

Local Manufacturers Are Operating at 20 Per cent Capacity

Let me take you to a different place: a manufacturing company in Bulawayo.

The owner showed me around his factory. It was impressive. Rows of machines. Skilled workers. A quality control system that would impress any auditor.

But the machines were not running. Most of them were silent.

“We are operating at 20 per cent capacity,” he told me. “Our competitors in South Africa are at 100 per cent. Our competitors in China are at 100 per cent. We are at 20 per cent.”

I asked him why.

“Cheap imports,” he said. “Some of them are smuggled. Some are just cheap because they come from factories that produce ten times what we produce. Either way, we cannot compete on price. So we sit idle. Our machines sit idle. Our workers sit idle.”

He explained the arithmetic to me slowly, as if I were a child.

Low utilisation means higher per-unit costs. Higher per-unit costs mean higher prices. Higher prices mean no customers. No customers means low utilisation.

“It is a cycle,” he said. “And I do not know how to break it. We have the skills. We have the facilities. We want the business. But we cannot sell at a loss. And we cannot sell at a price that is three times higher than what the customer can get from China.”

Suppliers Are Not Engaging Miners

Here is the part that frustrates me the most, because this one is fixable. This one does not require new laws or foreign investment. It requires a conversation.

I sat down with a miner who has been in the industry for twenty years. He knows what he needs. He knows what he wants. He knows what he is willing to pay for.

“The suppliers do not ask us what we need,” he said. “They just show up with products and expect us to buy them.”

He gave me an example. A supplier brought in equipment that met Chinese standards, but his operation was not set up for those standards. The connections were different. The specifications were different. The whole system was incompatible.

“The equipment sat in a warehouse, unused. We paid for it because we had to. But we never used it.”

He shook his head.

“There is a mismatch. They sell what they have. They do not ask what we need. If they just came and talked to us—asked questions, understood our operations, listened to our problems—they would sell more. We would buy more. Everyone would win.”

I asked him if any supplier had ever come to visit his mine—not to sell something, but just to understand.

He thought for a moment.

“No,” he said. “Not once.”

Some Miners Have Found a Workaround

When the formal supply chain fails, miners create their own solutions.

I visited a community engineering company in one of the mining districts. It was started by a group of miners who got tired of waiting for spare parts.

“We could not get what we needed from the suppliers, so we decided to make it ourselves,” one of them told me.

They started small. A few tools. A few skilled workers. Word spread. Soon, other miners were coming to them for repairs, parts, and advice.

“We are not big. We cannot supply a whole processing plant. But for the small things—the things that break often, the things that stop production—we are faster than anyone. And we are cheaper than anyone.”

I asked him if they could scale up—if they could supply the big mines, processing plants, and refineries.

“We would love to. But we do not have the capital, the equipment, or the support. We are a workaround, not a solution.”

The Beneficiation Agenda Depends on Solving This

Let me connect the dots for you.

The government’s beneficiation strategy is built on a simple premise: process minerals here, capture value here, create jobs here.

But processing minerals here requires functional supply chains. A lithium sulphate plant cannot run without spare parts. A concentrator cannot operate without consumables. A refinery cannot function without maintenance services.

If every spare part, consumable, and maintenance service has to be imported from China or South Africa, then the beneficiation agenda becomes an import-dependent, foreign-currency-consuming exercise.

That is not industrialisation. That is substitution.

“We are building these beautiful plants,” one miner said to me, “but we are not building the ecosystem around them. We are not building the supply chain. We are not building the local capacity to keep them running. And that means they will always be dependent on someone else.”

There Are Signs of Progress

I do not want to be all doom and gloom. There are signs of progress—small signs, but signs.

The Zimbabwe Miners Federation has partnered with Dinson Iron and Steel Company to boost local machinery production.

“Gone are the days of importing products such as bow and hammer mills, which are made from steel,” ZMF president Henrietta Rushwaya said.

Local engineering firms like Value Engineering are also stepping up, providing machining, fabrication, and hydraulic support to mining operations across the country.

“We’re helping clients reduce costly downtime, which directly impacts production and revenue,” mechanical engineer Alfred Makuyana said.

These are small steps, but they are steps in the right direction.

What Needs to Happen Now

The disconnect between miners and suppliers is not insurmountable, but closing it requires action on three fronts.

For suppliers: Stop selling what you have. Start supplying what miners need. Visit the mines. Ask questions. Understand the operations. Price competitively. Recognise that the market is small but loyal. Miners will support local suppliers who offer fair prices and reliable service.

For miners: Where possible, support local engineering companies. Provide feedback to suppliers about what is needed. Recognise that local suppliers cannot compete on price if they are operating at 20 percent capacity while Chinese competitors operate at 100 percent.

For government: Support local manufacturing through policy. The DISCO partnership is a start, but more needs to be done. Enforce anti-smuggling laws to stop cheap imports from flooding the market. Provide incentives for local manufacturers to expand capacity. Recognise that the beneficiation agenda will fail if it is built on a broken supply chain.

I have been writing about Zimbabwe’s mining sector for a long time. I have seen policies come and go. I have seen strategies announced and abandoned. I have seen conferences full of promises and boardrooms empty of action.

But this beneficiation agenda feels different. It feels real. The ban is in place. The conditions are set. The plants are being built.

But none of it will matter if the supply chain is broken, because a lithium sulphate plant is just an expensive pile of metal if you cannot get a spare part when something breaks.

And something always breaks.

The path forward is not complicated. Suppliers need to engage miners. Miners need to support local suppliers. Government needs to level the playing field.

The alternative is a beneficiation agenda built on Chinese spare parts, South African consumables, and imported expertise. That is not the industrial revolution Zimbabwe is trying to build. It is the same extractive model, dressed up in new clothes.

The clock is ticking. The plants are being built. The ban is in place. The only missing piece is the supply chain to keep it all running.

The question is whether Zimbabwe will build it, or watch it be imported.

As the government pushes for a 26% stake in mining projects, investors face a delicate balancing act between resource nationalism and investment certainty. Zimbabwe wants a piece of its mining pie, not just through taxes, royalties, and beneficiation conditions, but an actual stake, a seat at the table.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The government has signalled its intention to hold a 26% free-carry stake in new mining projects and is preparing to negotiate with existing operators to acquire a similar shareholding. The policy, first floated in late 2024, is expected to be introduced in 2026, and it has set the industry abuzz with equal parts curiosity and concern.

But here is the question that nobody has answered satisfactorily: Will miners who were promised 100% ownership be willing to give up a chunk of their projects? And what does this mean for Zimbabwe as a destination for investment?

What Is a Free Carry?

Let us start with clarity.

A free-carry stake means the government receives an equity interest in a mining project without contributing capital to exploration, development, or construction costs. The government’s carry is essentially free. It does not pay for its shares. Instead, it receives them as a condition of the mining licence.

The government then receives dividends proportionate to its shareholding once the project becomes profitable. It bears no risk during the exploration and development phases. It contributes no capital during construction. It simply waits for the project to succeed and then collects.

From a government perspective, this is an attractive model. From an investor’s perspective, it is a direct transfer of value from the company to the state.

What the Government Is Saying

Mines Secretary Pfungwa Kunaka has been open about the government’s ambitions.

“We need to move to a level where we reach 26% shareholding in most of the big projects,” Kunaka told Bloomberg. “A lot of these things would take negotiations with the investors that are on the ground.”

He acknowledged that changing the rules mid-game is delicate.

“Obviously, when you have decisions which were made some years back, and decisions were made on the basis of a certain framework, you cannot just willy-nilly go and change that. It takes negotiations.”

The government already holds a 15% free-carry stake in platinum miner Karo Resources, providing a precedent for the model. The question is whether that precedent can be extended across the sector.

The Investor’s Dilemma

Now, let me take you inside the mind of an investor.

You are a mining company. You have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in exploration, feasibility studies, and construction. You have taken all the risk. You have spent years navigating regulatory hurdles, infrastructure deficits, and commodity price volatility. You were promised 100% ownership. Your financial models were built on that promise.

Now, the government wants 26%.

Not as a loan. Not as a partnership where they contribute capital. As a free carry. They want equity without investment. They want dividends without risk.

What should be done?

The answer is not simple. Some investors may accept it as the cost of doing business in Zimbabwe. Others may reconsider their commitments. And for projects that have not yet broken ground, the calculus changes entirely.

The Production Sharing Alternative

Here is where the conversation becomes more interesting.

A production sharing model might be a more elegant solution than a free-carry equity stake.

Under a production sharing agreement, the government does not take an equity stake. Instead, it takes a share of the actual minerals produced. The company recovers its costs from a portion of production, and the remaining profit from minerals are split between the company and the government according to an agreed formula.

The advantages are clear:

• No dilution of ownership. The company retains 100% equity but shares production.
• Alignment of interests. Both parties benefit when production increases.
• Flexibility. The share can be adjusted based on profitability, commodity prices, or investment levels.
• No valuation disputes. There is no argument about what the company is worth or what 26% should cost.

For Zimbabwe, a production sharing model could deliver the same economic benefits, government participation in mineral wealth, without the investor hostility that comes with expropriating equity.

The Lithium Sector Test Case

Consider Zimbabwe’s lithium sector.

Large-scale producers, Sinomine’s Bikita Minerals, Chengxin Lithium’s Sabi Star Mine, Yahua Group’s Kamativi Lithium Company, Huayou Cobalt’s Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, Tsingshan’s Gwanda Lithium Mine, have already invested billions of dollars under the 100% ownership promise.

These companies are currently building lithium sulphate plants to comply with the government’s beneficiation deadline of January 2027. They are spending hundreds of millions more on processing infrastructure. They are employing thousands of Zimbabweans.

If the government now demands a 26% free-carry stake, what happens?

Will the companies accept it? Will they negotiate? Or will they recalculate their returns and conclude that Zimbabwe is no longer worth the risk?

The government’s argument is that the free-carry stake represents the value of the mineral resource itself, the ore in the ground belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, and the free carry is a way of recognising that ownership. It is a compelling argument, but it does not change the arithmetic for the investor.

The Tax Question

If the government takes a 26% free-carry stake, what happens to taxes?

Currently, mining companies pay royalties ranging from 1% to 10%, depending on the mineral, corporate income tax of 24.72% for mining operations, and various levies, including the Community Development Levy.

If the government is now also receiving dividends from its 26% stake, should taxes be reduced? The argument is simple: the government is now both a shareholder and a tax collector. If it is benefiting directly from profits through dividends, perhaps the tax burden on the remaining 74% should be adjusted.

The counterargument is equally simple: taxes are the price of operating in Zimbabwe. Dividends are a separate return on equity. The two are not interchangeable.

This is a conversation that needs to happen before the policy is implemented, not after.

The Dividend Declaration Problem

Here is a practical concern that is rarely discussed.

If the government holds a 26% free-carry stake, it is entitled to 26% of declared dividends. But what if the company does not declare dividends? What if it reinvests profits into expansion, or uses them to service debt, or simply accumulates them as retained earnings?

In many jurisdictions, mining companies are notorious for not paying dividends, preferring to reinvest cash flow into new projects or acquisitions. The government’s free-carry stake could end up being worth very little if dividends are never declared.

The solution is to negotiate dividend policies as part of the free-carry agreement. Minimum payout ratios. Time bound distribution requirements. Mechanisms to ensure that the government’s participation is not rendered worthless by corporate financial engineering.

The Broader Context: Resource Nationalism in Africa

Zimbabwe is not alone in pursuing greater value from its mineral wealth.

Across Africa, countries are tightening their grip on natural resources. Tanzania renegotiated its mining contracts. The Democratic Republic of Congo increased state ownership in mining projects. Namibia banned the export of unprocessed critical minerals. Ghana revised its fiscal terms.

Zimbabwe’s 26% free-carry proposal fits within this broader trend. The question is whether Zimbabwe can execute it in a way that does not trigger capital flight.

Finance Permanent Secretary George Guvamanga recently told investors at the Investing in Africa Mining Indaba that Zimbabwe offers “world-class geology, competitive operating costs, and a legislated, transparent fiscal regime”. He warned that Zimbabwe is “not seeking speculative capital” but “long-term, technically competent, and well capitalised investors”.

The free-carry policy will test whether that message holds. If investors perceive the policy as opportunistic expropriation, Zimbabwe’s safe haven narrative will collapse. If it is negotiated fairly, transparently, and predictably, it could become a model for resource nationalism done right.

The Verdict: Production Sharing Over Free Carry

Here is my view.

Free carry is a blunt instrument. It takes equity without contribution. It changes the rules mid-game. It creates winners and losers based on negotiation skill rather than economic merit.

A production sharing model is more elegant. It aligns interests. It avoids valuation disputes. It gives the government a share of production without diluting ownership.

If Zimbabwe wants to participate in mining profits without scaring away investment, it should look to production sharing, not free carry. The government should take a share of what comes out of the ground, not a share of the company that digs it up.

The difference may seem technical. But for investors, it is the difference between partnership and expropriation.

What Comes Next

The policy is expected to be introduced in 2026. Negotiations with existing operators will follow. The details, which projects are affected, how the 26% is valued, what dividend policies apply, will determine whether this policy unlocks value or destroys it.

The lithium sector will be the test case. If the government can negotiate fairly with the six large-scale producers, acknowledging their existing investments while securing a fair share of future returns, the policy could succeed. If it demands 26% without compromise, the investment climate will suffer.

The government’s argument is compelling: the mineral wealth belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, and the people deserve a direct stake in its extraction. But the manner of that stake matters as much as the principle.

A production sharing model would achieve the same goal without the investor hostility. It is not too late to pivot.

The clock is ticking. The investors are watching. And Zimbabwe’s reputation as a destination for mining capital hangs in the balance.

Zimbabwe is moving to align its chrome industry with tightening global climate rules, as rising carbon costs in key export markets begin to reshape how ferrochrome is produced and traded internationally, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The shift builds on gains from the 2022 chrome ore export ban, which pushed producers into local beneficiation and lifted ferrochrome output. With smelting capacity expanding and new investments entering the sector, attention is gradually shifting from production volumes to the carbon footprint of that growth.

In his speech, delivered by Vice President Constantine Chiwenga at Africa Chromium Week 2026, Mnangagwa said sustainability is now central to the future of the chrome industry as global markets adjust to carbon pricing systems, particularly in Europe.

“Beneficiation strategy must now be anchored on sustainability. As carbon pricing regimes take effect across key markets, particularly in Europe, the global chromium industry is undergoing a fundamental shift toward low-emissions supply chains and cleaner production systems. This is not a distant transition, it is already reshaping competitiveness and market access.”

Mnangagwa said the industry can no longer rely on high-carbon production models if it is to remain competitive in export markets that are increasingly factoring emissions into trade decisions.

The remarks signal a broader shift in Zimbabwe’s chrome strategy, moving beyond output expansion toward aligning production with emerging global environmental standards.

Ferrochrome smelting remains highly energy-intensive, exposing producers to tightening carbon-related trade measures, particularly in Europe, where emissions compliance rules are becoming more stringent.

As a result, new investments in the sector are increasingly being structured around energy efficiency improvements and integrated power solutions aimed at reducing emissions while sustaining output growth.

The shift is also beginning to influence investment flows, with financiers placing greater emphasis on environmental performance and governance standards when assessing mining and metallurgical projects.

Government officials have framed the transition as a strategic opportunity to position Zimbabwe more firmly within global supply chains that are increasingly sensitive to carbon intensity.

Mnangagwa also indicated that Zimbabwe is exploring longer-term opportunities in carbon-linked and environmental markets as part of its broader industrial strategy.

However, the transition will require sustained investment in energy infrastructure, technology upgrades, and skills development across the sector.

As global chromium markets evolve alongside stricter climate policies, Zimbabwe faces the challenge of maintaining production growth while improving emissions performance to remain competitive.

Energy has quietly become one of the most decisive factors shaping mining competitiveness. Beneath the headlines of rising copper and cobalt demand lies a more immediate operational reality: keeping the lights on is becoming more expensive, less predictable and increasingly complex.

By Heleen Katja Tshibumbu

For decades, mining operations across northern Zambia and the southern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have relied on a combination of grid-supplied hydropower and diesel-based backup generation. That model is now under strain. Hydropower output has become less reliable due to recurring drought conditions and infrastructure limitations, while diesel (long considered a dependable fallback) is emerging as a costly and volatile liability. (IEA, 2022).

The latest surge in global oil prices, driven in part by geopolitical instability in the Middle East and ongoing risks to key supply routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, has brought this vulnerability into sharp focus. For Copperbelt operators, far removed from global oil hubs and dependent on complex overland fuel logistics, the impact is amplified. Diesel is no longer just an operational input; it is a strategic exposure.

The economics are difficult to ignore. Diesel-generated electricity in remote African mining environments typically costs between $0.15 and $0.50 per kilowatt-hour, with landlocked regions such as the Copperbelt often sitting at the upper end of that range due to transport and handling costs. These figures are not static. They’re quite fluid and move with global oil prices, exchange rates and supply chain disruptions, introducing a level of cost volatility that complicates planning and erodes margins. (IEA, 2022).

The numbers tell a compelling story. Solar PV combined with battery storage can now deliver electricity at between $0.06 and $0.20 per kilowatt-hour in many African contexts, while hybrid systems integrating renewables with diesel typically range between $0.08 and $0.25 per kilowatt-hour (IRENA, 2023; World Bank, 2020; IFC, 2019). Even at the upper end, these costs compare favourably to diesel-only generation, and at the lower end they represent a step change in energy economics.

Across the Copperbelt itself, early examples of this transition are already visible. In Zambia, First Quantum Minerals has integrated large-scale solar generation into its operations at the Kansanshi Mine, reducing reliance on grid and diesel supply while improving energy security. Similarly, Barrick Gold Corporation has advanced renewable energy integration at the Lumwana Mine, where solar power is being deployed to stabilise energy supply and offset fuel consumption. In the DRC, operators in the Kolwezi region are increasingly evaluating hybrid systems as grid constraints and diesel costs converge, signalling a broader regional shift.

For a Copperbelt mine currently producing power at around $0.30 per kilowatt-hour using diesel, a transition to a hybrid system could reduce costs to approximately $0.15 per kilowatt-hour. In more optimised scenarios, particularly where solar resources are strong, costs can fall closer to $0.10 per kilowatt-hour. This translates into potential savings of between 50% and 70% per unit of electricity generated, fundamentally reshaping the cost base of mining operations.

To be clear, the shift is not about eliminating diesel altogether. In the Copperbelt context, where reliability remains vital, diesel will continue to play a role. The objective is to reduce dependence on a single, volatile energy source. Hybridisation provides a practical pathway to achieve this. By integrating solar and, where viable, wind generation into existing energy systems, mines can significantly reduce fuel consumption while maintaining system stability.

This approach also enhances overall efficiency. Diesel generators operating alongside renewable energy sources can run at more consistent and optimal loads, reducing fuel consumption per kilowatt-hour and extending equipment lifespan. At the same time, the proportion of energy derived from fuel, unfortunately subject to global price volatility, is reduced, improving cost predictability. Research by the Rocky Mountain Institute highlights that hybrid renewable systems in mining applications can deliver both cost savings and improved operational performance when properly integrated (RMI, 2020).

For the Copperbelt, the case for solar integration is particularly strong. The region benefits from high levels of solar irradiation, making it well suited to large-scale PV deployment. The modular nature of solar installations allows mines to scale capacity in line with demand, while battery storage enables greater flexibility in managing load profiles and intermittency. Wind, although more site-specific, can further enhance system resilience where conditions permit.

Beyond cost and efficiency, energy diversification strengthens security of supply. By reducing reliance on diesel deliveries, mining operations become less exposed to logistical disruptions and geopolitical risks. This is particularly relevant in the DRC, where infrastructure constraints can complicate fuel transport. At the same time, the broader industry context is shifting. As global mining companies face increasing pressure to reduce emissions and align with decarbonisation goals, energy sourcing is becoming a central component of corporate strategy. Hybrid systems offer a practical and immediate pathway to lowering emissions intensity without compromising output (Bloomberg NEF, 2023).

Adoption is not without challenges. Renewable energy systems require upfront capital investment, and integrating hybrid solutions introduces a massive degree of technical complexity. Historically, these factors have slowed uptake. But we have to keep in mind that the landscape is evolving. Financing models such as power purchase agreements and energy-as-a-service structures are reducing the need for upfront capital, while advances in control systems are simplifying integration and improving reliability.

What is increasingly clear is that the status quo is no longer sustainable. Diesel, once the default solution to energy insecurity, is now a source of both cost pressure and operational risk. The current volatility in global fuel markets has simply accelerated a shift that was already underway.

For the Copperbelt, the implications are significant. As demand for its minerals continues to grow, so too will the importance of cost competitiveness and operational resilience. Energy sits at the centre of both. Mines that move decisively to diversify their energy mix stand to benefit from lower costs, greater stability and improved alignment with global market expectations. And those that do not may find themselves increasingly exposed to price shocks, supply disruptions and a rapidly shifting competitive landscape.

The Copperbelt is  defined by its resource wealth, but the next phase of advantage may not be determined solely by what lies beneath the ground, but by how effectively it is powered above it.

Zimbabwe is moving closer to formalising its upstream oil and gas framework, with a Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement (PPSA) between the government and Invictus Energy expected to be signed in April, a key step that could advance development of the country’s Cabora Bassa Basin project, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The agreement follows the completion of a final “all-party review,” according to Invictus Energy, and is set to establish the fiscal and legal foundation for petroleum exploration and production in Zimbabwe.

Once executed, the PPSA is expected to serve as a model contract for future investors entering the country’s hydrocarbons sector, effectively shaping the regulatory architecture of Zimbabwe’s emerging oil and gas industry.

The deal comes as Zimbabwe continues efforts to diversify its energy mix and reduce reliance on imported fuels and electricity, with policymakers increasingly viewing domestic gas resources as a potential long-term alternative for power generation and industrial supply.

Invictus Managing Director Scott Macmillan said the company is working closely with authorities as the agreement nears completion.

“We continue to work closely with the Government of Zimbabwe as the PPSA moves toward execution.

Establishing a strong and bankable petroleum industry regulatory framework is critical to unlocking the full value of the Cabora Bassa Project and the Mukuyu discovery.

We remain well-positioned to move forward rapidly following execution of the PPSA, with a clear pathway towards commercialisation and development, including relevant permits for an early production gas-to-power pilot project.”

Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube said the agreement reflects a deliberate effort to balance investor confidence with long-term national interests while ensuring alignment with international best practice.

“The Cabora Bassa Project represents a transformative opportunity for Zimbabwe’s energy sector and broader economy.

The additional time taken reflects a clear commitment to ensuring the agreement is robust, internationally competitive, and fully aligned with long-term sector development objectives.

The Petroleum Production Sharing Agreement reflects international best practice while safeguarding Zimbabwe’s long-term national interests and establishes a durable and investor-aligned framework,” Ncube said.

Invictus Energy has been at the centre of exploration activity in the Cabora Bassa Basin in northern Zimbabwe, where it has already reported significant gas-condensate discoveries at the Mukuyu prospect. The company is now preparing to move into appraisal and potential early development phases.

Execution of the PPSA would unlock the next stage of its work programme, including further appraisal of the Mukuyu gas field—following the Mukuyu-1 and Mukuyu-2 discoveries—and the drilling of the Musuma-1 exploration well in the eastern portion of the basin, which is designed to test a new geological play.

The company says the agreement is critical to enabling a clearer pathway toward commercialisation, including plans for an early production gas-to-power pilot project, which could provide initial output to support Zimbabwe’s power supply constraints.

Zimbabwe’s hydrocarbon potential remains largely underexplored, but interest in the Cabora Bassa Basin has increased following early discoveries that suggest the presence of commercially viable gas resources in the onshore basin.

If successfully executed and advanced to production, the project could mark one of the country’s most significant steps toward establishing a domestic natural gas industry, with potential implications for power generation, industrial energy supply, and import substitution.

For now, the April PPSA signing is being viewed as a critical gateway moment—determining how quickly Zimbabwe can transition from exploration success to commercial development in its upstream energy sector.