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Why Knowing The Difference Between A Partnership and a Joint Venture Can Save Your Mine

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  • A Lawyer’s guide to choosing the right legal vehicle and the right co-pilot for your mining operations

Not long ago, a colleague of mine shared a story that perfectly illustrates one of the most common yet devastating legal missteps in Zimbabwe’s mining sector. He had advised two longtime friends who had decided to venture into mining. Full of optimism, they formed a general partnership and registered several promising mining claims under their joint names. The geology was sound, and their initial surface work looked excellent.

A few months later, my colleague received a call from a well-capitalised investor. The investor was looking to set up a custom milling and elution plant in Zimbabwe and needed a reliable source of ore. My colleague immediately connected the investor with the friends. It was, by all accounts, a done deal. The capital was there, the ore was there, and the market was hungry.

But the deal never happened.

As negotiations began, the two friends, bound together in their general partnership, could not agree on anything. One partner wanted to lease the claims to the investor for a fixed royalty; the other wanted to leverage the claims for equity in the new milling plant. Because they were in a general partnership, every major decision required consensus. Their personality differences, previously masked by the excitement of exploration, became a paralysing force. The investor, frustrated by the deadlock and unwilling to inject capital into a dysfunctional partnership, walked away.

Had the two friends understood the legal distinctions between a Partnership and a Joint Venture (JV), they might have structured their relationship differently, or the investor might have formed a distinct JV with them that bypassed their internal deadlock. Instead, their chosen legal structure became their prison.

As a lawyer, I spend a significant amount of time untangling these very messes. Understanding the difference between a Partnership and a Joint Venture is not just legal trivia, it is the blueprint for how you will operate, how you will attract capital, and how you will protect your personal assets.

The core differences: Partnership vs. Joint Venture

While both structures involve two or more parties coming together to make a profit, their legal DNA is entirely different.

The purpose and lifespan

A Partnership is a long-term business marriage. It is an ongoing business operation designed to last indefinitely. When you form a partnership to mine, you are agreeing to run a mining business together, sharing all the day-to-day operations, profits, and liabilities across all your mining activities.

A Joint Venture, on the other hand, is a project-specific alliance. It is typically formed for a single, defined purpose, such as developing a specific shaft, building a custom milling plant, or executing a single exploration program. Once that specific project is complete, or if it fails, the JV can be dissolved without affecting the core businesses of the parties involved.

Liability: The danger zone

This is where the distinction becomes critical. In a standard general Partnership, the partners share “joint and several liability.” This means if your partner signs a disastrous equipment lease or causes an environmental spill, creditors or the Environmental Management Agency can come after your personal assets, your house, your car, and your personal bank accounts to satisfy the partnership’s debts.

A Joint Venture, particularly an incorporated one (where the parties form a new, separate company, like a Private Limited Company, specifically for the project), offers a liability shield. The liabilities of the JV are ring-fenced within that specific entity. If the JV’s milling plant goes bankrupt, the investor’s parent company and the miner’s other claims are generally protected.

Control and autonomy

In a Partnership, control is integrated. Partners generally have equal say in the business, and the actions of one partner legally bind the other. This is exactly what paralysed the friends in my colleague’s story. In a Joint Venture, the parties maintain their separate business identities and autonomy. The JV agreement dictates exactly who controls what within the specific project. A miner might retain total control over extraction, while the investor retains total control over the milling plant and finances, with a clear formula for sharing the output.

The ideal agreement structure: what should the friends have done?

Now, let me address the critical question: if the friends in my colleague’s story had come to me before forming their partnership, what would I have advised them to do? The answer is not simply “form a JV instead of a partnership.” The answer is more nuanced. The friends needed a two-stage legal structure that would allow them to work together as partners on exploration and claim development, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility of bringing in external capital without allowing their internal disagreements to become deal-killers.

Step 1: The internal Partnership Agreement

The friends should have signed a comprehensive Mining Partnership Agreement that governed their relationship with each other. This agreement should have covered far more than simply saying “we are partners.” First, it should have defined the ownership of the mining claims, whether they held them equally or in defined percentages, and whether either partner could transfer their interest without the other’s consent. This clarity prevents future disputes over who actually owns what.

Second, it should have documented capital contributions. Exactly what was each person contributing? Money? Equipment? Labour? Technical know-how? Licences? When disputes arise, people’s memories diverge. A written record prevents “I thought you were contributing the compressor” from becoming a legal battle.

Third, the agreement should have clearly defined management roles. Who handles day-to-day operations? Who manages finances? Who has authority to negotiate with third parties? Who can make decisions unilaterally, and which decisions require both partners’ consent? In the friends’ case, this might have specified that one partner manages extraction while the other manages business development and investor relations.

Fourth, the agreement should have established major decision thresholds. Which matters require unanimous consent, such as selling the claims, bringing in an investor, or taking on significant debt? Which matters can be decided by majority vote or by the managing partner? This is where the friends’ agreement failed catastrophically. There was no mechanism for deciding what to do when they disagreed on the investor proposal.

Fifth, it should have addressed profit and loss sharing. How would income, expenses, and liabilities be allocated between the partners? Would it be 50-50, or some other split? And critically, how would losses be handled if the operation failed?

Sixth, the agreement should have included a default clause. What happens if one partner fails to contribute promised funds? What if one partner disappears or obstructs operations? What if one partner acts dishonestly? Without this clause, the other partner has limited recourse.

Seventh, there should have been an exit clause. How can one partner leave the partnership? How is their interest valued? Does the remaining partner have a right of first refusal to buy out the departing partner? This prevents a partner from being trapped in a relationship that has soured.

Finally, the agreement should have included a dispute resolution mechanism. Before rushing to court, the partners would be required to attempt negotiation, then mediation, then arbitration. This keeps disputes private and manageable. However, the most critical clause, the one that would have saved the friends’ deal, was something the agreement did not have: an Investor Admission Clause.

Step 2: The Investor Admission Clause (The game-changer)

This clause would have provided that if a bona fide investment proposal was received, the partners would be required to follow a defined process, rather than allowing one partner to simply veto the opportunity. First, both partners would have to review the proposal within a specified timeframe, say, 14 days. This prevents one partner from sitting on the proposal indefinitely. Second, both partners would be required to obtain independent legal and financial advice on the proposal. This ensures both partners have professional guidance, not just their own instincts or emotions.

Third, the partners would have to meet and discuss the proposal in good faith. They could not simply refuse to engage. Fourth, and this is the critical part if the partners still disagreed on whether to accept the investment after this process, the matter would be submitted to mediation or expert determination by a neutral third party. The mediator or expert would review the proposal and make a recommendation. If the recommendation was to proceed, the partners would be bound to proceed, or one partner could trigger a buy-sell mechanism to exit the partnership. Fifth, if the partners agreed to proceed, the partnership would then form a separate Joint Venture Agreement with the investor.

This clause is powerful because it prevents one partner from simply vetoing a life-changing opportunity based on personality or stubbornness. It forces a structured conversation and, if necessary, a neutral decision-maker. In the friends’ case, a mediator might have recommended a compromise: one partner could manage mining operations (satisfying the partner who wanted operational control) while the other partner sat on the JV board and received equity (satisfying the partner who wanted equity participation). The friends’ stubbornness would have been overcome by the process itself.

Step 3: The separate Joint Venture Agreement

Once the investment was approved (or the deadlock was resolved through mediation), the friends and the investor would form a separate Joint Venture Agreement. This is critical: the JV Agreement is not an amendment to the partnership agreement. It is a completely separate legal document that governs the relationship between the partnership and the investor.

The JV Agreement should have defined the parties to the JV, the partnership (as represented by both partners), the investor, and any other parties. It should have clearly stated the JV’s purpose: the specific project of developing the milling and elution plant, securing ore supply, processing, and gold recovery.

The agreement should have specified capital contributions, how much capital each party contributes and the timeline for contributions. It should have defined equity and profit sharing, and what percentage of profits each party receives. For example, the friends might receive 30% of profits in exchange for the mining claims and ore supply, while the investor receives 70% in exchange for the USD500,000 [Five Hundred Thousand United States dollars] capital investment.

The agreement should have established the management structure. Would the JV be governed by a board of directors? Would there be a managing partner? Who has decision-making authority on what matters? This prevents the investor from being surprised by operational decisions. Critically, the agreement should have defined operational control. The friends (or their representative) would retain control over mining operations, extraction, blasting, and equipment maintenance. The investor would retain control over the milling plant and finances. This separation of control prevents either party from interfering in the other’s domain.

The agreement should have specified ore supply terms, the quantity, quality, and timing of ore deliveries from the mining operation to the milling plant. This prevents disputes about whether the miner is supplying enough ore or ore of sufficient quality. The agreement should have addressed financial reporting, how often financial statements are provided, how profits are calculated, and how profits are distributed. Transparency prevents accusations of hidden profits or underpayment.

The agreement should have included exit strategies. How can the investor exit the JV? After 5 years? Upon achieving a certain return? What happens if the investor wants to exit early? How can the friends exit if the investor defaults on capital contributions? Clear exit mechanisms prevent parties from being trapped in a failing venture. Finally, the agreement should have included a tiered dispute resolution clause: negotiation (30 days), mediation (30 days), and arbitration (binding). This ensures that disputes between the friends and the investor do not paralyse the JV.

Step 4: Why this structure would have saved the deal

Here is the critical insight: with this two-stage structure in place, the friends’ internal disagreement would not have been fatal to the deal. When the investor emerged, the friends would have been required (by their partnership agreement) to follow the investor admission process. They would have had to submit their disagreement to mediation. A mediator, reviewing the investor’s proposal and understanding the friends’ complementary strengths, would have recommended a compromise. The friends could have structured the JV so that one partner managed mining operations while the other partner sat on the JV board and received equity. Both partners would have gotten something they wanted.

The separate JV Agreement would have provided the framework for this compromise. The friends’ internal partnership agreement would have continued to govern their relationship with each other, while the JV Agreement governed their relationship with the investor. The investor, seeing a clear governance structure and knowing that the friends’ internal disputes would not paralyse the JV, would have been confident enough to proceed.

Instead, the friends’ lack of structure meant that their personality conflict became the investor’s problem. The investor walked away, and the friends lost everything.

This is the lesson: it is not enough to choose the right legal vehicle, partnership or JV. You must also build the right internal mechanisms to manage disagreements and to welcome external capital without allowing internal conflicts to become fatal. The investor admission clause is that mechanism. It is the difference between a lost opportunity and a life-changing deal.

How to choose a successful Partner (and survive them)

Whether you are entering a long-term partnership or a project-specific JV, the legal structure can only protect you so much. The ultimate success of the venture depends on the partner you choose. Before signing any agreement, I advise my clients to evaluate potential partners against a strict criteria:

  1. Financial transparency and capacity

Never take a partner’s financial health on faith. If an investor promises capital for a JV, demand proof of funds. If a fellow miner wants to form a partnership, ask to see their tax clearance certificates and past production records. A partner who hides their finances during the “dating” phase will certainly hide them during the “marriage.”

  1. Aligned exit strategies

The most important conversation to have with a potential partner is how you will break up. Do you want to mine this claim for twenty years and pass it to your children, while your partner wants to prove the reserve and sell it to a multinational in three years? If your exit timelines do not align, the venture will end in a bitter legal dispute.

  1. Complementary, not duplicative, skills

The best JVs are built on complementary strengths. If you have the ore and the local operational know-how, you need a partner with capital and perhaps metallurgical expertise. If you both want to be the “boss on the ground,” you are setting up a power struggle.

  1. A clean legal and regulatory history

In a partnership, your partner’s reputation becomes your reputation. Conduct basic due diligence. Do they have a history of environmental violations? Are they embroiled in litigation with previous partners? A bad actor will drag your pristine mining claim into their legal mud.

  1. Willingness to formalise

This is the ultimate litmus test. If a potential partner says, “We don’t need lawyers, let’s just do a handshake deal,” walk away immediately. A trustworthy partner welcomes a clear, professionally drafted agreement because they know it protects both parties.

In conclusion

The friends in my colleague’s story lost a life-changing investment because they chose a legal structure that amplified their disagreements rather than containing them.

In mining, the rocks beneath your feet are hard, but the legal structures you build above ground must be flexible, precise, and fit for purpose. Do not default to a general partnership simply because it is easy. Evaluate your goals, assess your risks, choose your partners ruthlessly, and use the right legal vehicle, be it a Partnership or a Joint Venture, to drive your mining operation toward success.


About the Author:

Namatirai Ruzvidzo is a registered Legal Practitioner, Conveyancer and Notary Public. She possesses over 15 years specializing in Commercial law, Mining law and Property law. She practices in Avondale, Harare, under the Law Firm, Ruzvidzo Legal Counsel. She can be reached on +263 784 228 534 or email [email protected], copying [email protected]

Zimbabwe’s mineral export earnings surge 57% in Q1 2026 to US$2.37 billion

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Zimbabwe’s mining sector has started the year on a robust footing, with total mineral export revenue surging by 57.4% in the first quarter of 2026 to reach an impressive US$2.37 billion, up from US$1.31 billion recorded in the same period last year, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

The strong performance reinforces the sector’s position as the country’s economic anchor and primary foreign currency generator.

The stellar growth was largely driven by favourable international commodity prices and a strategic policy shift toward beneficiation and value addition, which is beginning to yield tangible dividends for the extractive industry.

Gold maintained its status as Zimbabwe’s single largest export earner, contributing approximately 58.4% of total Q1 mineral revenue. Gold exports soared by 83.1% to US$1.38 billion, up from US$755.2 million in Q1 2025. Deliveries to Fidelity Gold Refinery increased by 8.3% to 9,311.93 kilogrammes, with small-scale miners accounting for 6,510.91 kilogrammes, a 12.8% year-on-year increase, while large-scale miners recorded a marginal 1% decline to 2,801.02 kilogrammes. The policy change in March 2026, which suspended the 10% ZiG retention requirement, temporarily disrupted artisanal and small-scale mining deliveries but is expected to boost volumes in subsequent quarters.

The platinum group metals segment delivered the strongest percentage revenue growth, more than doubling export earnings to US$543.98 million, a 111.6% surge compared to US$257.11 million in Q1 2025. PGMs now account for approximately 23% of total mineral export revenue, up from 19.6% in the previous year. Production volumes for the quarter stood at 3,807.37 kilogrammes of platinum, 3,115.61 kilogrammes of palladium, 330.65 kilogrammes of rhodium, 194.90 kilogrammes of iridium, and 271.59 kilogrammes of ruthenium.

High-carbon ferrochrome and steel exports generated US$130.41 million in Q1 2026, a 40.7% increase from US$92.66 million in Q1 2025. Production of high-carbon ferrochrome reached 65,365.36 metric tonnes during the quarter.

Lithium continued its remarkable growth trajectory, with exports more than doubling to reach US$183.99 million, a 109.2% increase from US$87.93 million in Q1 2025. Production volumes for the quarter stood at 551,050.24 metric tonnes, representing a 53.72% increase from the 358,468.02 metric tonnes recorded in Q1 2025. Key contributors included Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, the Chinese-investor-expanded Bikita Minerals, and Kamativi Mining Company. The government’s February 2026 ban on unbeneficiated lithium ore exports has driven a shift toward processed lithium sulphate exports, significantly increasing value retention within the country.

Diamonds were the only mineral segment to record a revenue decline, with earnings falling 23.5% to US$21.55 million from US$28.17 million in Q1 2025. Production volumes dropped by 43.96% to 438,596.88 carats from 782,648.49 carats, primarily due to lower-grade ore processing at the Marange diamond fields and subdued global diamond prices.

Coal exports grew by 63.8% to US$6.67 million from US$4.07 million, with production reaching 1,562,185.84 metric tonnes. Coke exports recorded a modest 1.5% increase to US$52.80 million from US$52.00 million.

Chrome production for the quarter reached 178,425 metric tonnes, a decline of 61.68% from 465,638.82 metric tonnes in Q1 2025. Nickel production stood at 1,485.74 metric tonnes, down 52.03% from 3,097.46 metric tonnes, while copper production fell by 52.50% to 1,216.74 metric tonnes from 2,561.78 metric tonnes. Cobalt production declined by 66.64% to 25.93 metric tonnes from 77.74 metric tonnes.

Other minerals recorded varied performances. Granite production surged by 271.40% to 88,570.37 metric tonnes from 23,848 metric tonnes. Vermiculite production reached 5,328.35 metric tonnes, while silica and quartz production stood at 200 metric tonnes. Tantalite production was recorded at 40,851.37 metric tonnes, iron production at 181,812 metric tonnes, and limestone production at 239,926.78 metric tonnes. Antimony production reached 3,618,187.83 metric tonnes, while fluorspar production stood at 572.89 metric tonnes. Phosphate recorded no production during the quarter, a 100% decline from 1,004 metric tonnes in Q1 2025.

The production data present a nuanced picture, with gold and lithium recording meaningful growth while several key minerals, including chrome, nickel, copper, cobalt, and diamonds, recorded significant volume declines relative to Q1 2025. Addressing these production contractions through targeted investment in mining infrastructure, energy supply, and operational efficiency will be essential to sustaining revenue growth over the medium term.

Other minerals collectively generated US$44.47 million in export revenue, a 33.8% increase from US$33.22 million in Q1 2025.

The sector’s strong revenue performance, coupled with continued policy support for beneficiation and value addition, positions mining as a key driver of Zimbabwe’s economic development and its trajectory toward upper-middle-income status by 2030. Sustained momentum will require coordinated action across investment attraction, regulatory efficiency, and infrastructure development.

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 9 July 2026

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 9 July 2026, from the official gold buyer and exporter, Fidelity Gold Refinery (FGR).

1 oz = 31.1035 g

CategoryPrice (US$/g)Price (US$/oz)
SG 90% and Above122.543,811.22
SG 85% but Less Than 90%121.243,770.79
SG 80% but Less Than 85%119.943,730.35
SG 75% but Less Than 80%118.653,690.23
Sample (5–10 g)116.703,629.58
Fire Assay (Cash)123.193,831.43

 

Note: The Fire Assay cash price applies to gold above 100g, with no sample deduction.

A sample of not more than 10g is deducted for the Fire Assay Transfer price.


#GoldPrices #GoldBuying #GoldMarket #GoldTrading #GoldRate #GoldPriceToday #GoldNews #PreciousMetals #GoldIndustry #GoldEconomy #FidelityGoldRefinery

Granite production surges 271% in Q1 2026 as Zimbabwe pushes value addition agenda

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Zimbabwe’s granite sector has recorded a remarkable production surge in the first quarter of 2026, with output leaping by 271.4% to 88,570.37 metric tonnes from just 23,848 metric tonnes in the same period last year, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

According to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development’s Q1 performance report seen by this publication, the dramatic increase positions granite among the country’s fastest-growing mineral sectors, reflecting a strategic push toward rural industrialisation and value addition.

The surge comes as the government intensifies efforts to transform the sector from raw exports to processed finished products. The Mutoko area in Mashonaland East Province, which supplies approximately 75% of Zimbabwe’s annual black granite output and produces an estimated 150,000 tonnes each year, has emerged as the epicentre of this activity. The black granite, prized globally for its durability and sleek appearance, is a sought-after material for high-end countertops, flooring, and architectural finishes.

The Q1 production figures represent more than half of the 79,000 tonnes of granite exported during the first eight months of 2025, which were valued at US$10 million. This suggests that full-year 2026 production could substantially exceed previous years’ levels, potentially pushing export revenues significantly higher.

Value addition drive gains traction

For years, Zimbabwe’s granite was exported predominantly in its raw form, limiting the economic benefits accruing to local communities and the national treasury. However, the government’s rural industrialisation drive, championed by President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has prioritised value addition and beneficiation across the mining sector, with granite receiving particular attention.

The Rich Basin granite stone processing plant in Mutoko is now cutting and polishing approximately 70 tonnes of granite daily at its state-of-the-art facility, producing tiles and designed stone products for both local and international markets. The company exports to Poland, China, Germany, and the United States, among other destinations, and is seeking to expand operations with additional land from the local authority.

“For a long time, our granite was going out of the country and being exported in its raw form. However, President Mnangagwa insisted on value addition, and today these are the results,” said a former Minister of State for Provincial Affairs and Devolution for Mashonaland East during a tour of the Rich Basin plant.

Italian firm RED Graniti, operating through its Southern Graniti subsidiary, has been active in the country for over 15 years and currently runs three operational granite quarries in the Mutoko area. The company also operates a processing plant in Chitungwiza dedicated to transforming granite blocks into slabs, with production split between exports and the local market. Italian Ambassador Joseph Giacalone recently visited the facilities, emphasising that Italy fully supports companies operating in Zimbabwe and is working to stimulate investment, transparency, and industrial consolidation.

The granite sector is already a significant contributor to Zimbabwe’s mineral export basket, with building stone exports reaching US$13.9 million in 2022, making it the country’s 22nd most exported product that year. Major export destinations included Germany (US$3.78 million), France (US$3.45 million), Mozambique (US$2.72 million), Italy (US$1.42 million), and Spain (US$761,000). The fastest-growing markets between 2021 and 2022 were France, Germany, and Italy, indicating strengthening European demand for Zimbabwean granite.

Policy reforms reshape sector dynamics

In September 2025, the Cabinet resolved to reserve quarry and granite mining exclusively for indigenous Zimbabweans, adding the sector to the list of economic activities reserved for local investors.

This policy shift is complemented by a new mining tax regime introduced in January 2025, which doubled the levy on black granite and other minerals from 1% to 2% of gross value on sales within Zimbabwe or on exports. The levy must be paid in the currency of trade and applies to lithium, black granite, quarry stones, and uncut and cut dimensional stones.

The government has also mandated that mining companies establish community economic empowerment trusts to drive rural industrialisation through industrial parks and revenue-sharing mechanisms, ensuring that communities benefit from resource extraction in their areas. This aligns with broader efforts to create linkages between the mining sector and local economic development.

Environmental concerns temper optimism

Despite the sector’s impressive growth, environmental challenges persist. The Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe has raised concerns about the environmental cost of expanded granite mining, citing “significant environmental degradation, including vegetation clearing, rubble dumping, disruption of natural river flows, and pollution.”

The MMCZ has called for “stringent enforcement of environmental laws by relevant agencies to ensure sustainable mining practices and land rehabilitation,” warning that operations “continue to cause significant degradation” on a scale characterised by “widespread environmental abuse.”

Environmental groups have criticised lax enforcement and the inadequacy of penalties, arguing that current fines are often too low to deter well-funded mining companies and are viewed as a negligible “cost of doing business,” which undermines the authority of agencies such as the Environmental Management Agency.

Market outlook

Market analysts project that Zimbabwe’s granite sector will continue its growth trajectory, with the broader stone mining and quarrying market expected to experience a compound annual growth rate of 70.36% during the 2020–2024 period. The granite market specifically is projected to grow at a stable rate of 2.40% by 2027 within the African region, positioning Zimbabwe among key players alongside South Africa, Ethiopia, Algeria, and Nigeria.

The dramatic Q1 2026 production increase, combined with growing processing capacity and supportive policy frameworks, suggests that granite could emerge as a significant pillar of Zimbabwe’s mineral export revenue in the years ahead. For local communities in Mutoko and other granite-rich areas, the challenge and opportunity lie in translating this mineral wealth into sustainable economic development through genuine beneficiation, robust environmental safeguards, and meaningful community participation in the sector’s growth.

Zimbabwe Gold Export Earnings Surge 167% as Bullion Rally Sets Stage for Record FX Inflows

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Zimbabwe’s gold export earnings surged 167% in the first five months of 2026 as a sharp rally in international bullion prices lifted the value of shipments, putting the country on course for another record year of foreign currency inflows, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) data show gold exports generated US$3.07 billion between January and May, compared with US$1.15 billion during the same period last year.

The performance highlights gold’s growing importance to Zimbabwe’s external sector, with the precious metal strengthening its position as the country’s largest source of foreign currency at a time when other export sectors face varying levels of pressure.

The increase in receipts has largely been driven by the exceptional performance of international bullion markets. Gold prices have remained near historic highs, supported by strong central bank purchases, geopolitical uncertainty and investor demand for safe-haven assets.

That price environment has significantly increased the value of Zimbabwe’s gold shipments. May alone generated US$1.16 billion in export receipts, compared with US$278.1 million in the same month last year, while April earnings stood at US$97.2 million.

However, the surge in export earnings has not been solely a price story. Production performance has also provided support for the sector’s strong showing, strengthening expectations that foreign currency inflows could remain elevated in the months ahead.

Gold deliveries to Fidelity Gold Refinery reached 4.81 tonnes in June, taking first-half deliveries to about 21.4 tonnes and keeping Zimbabwe on track towards its 50-tonne production target for 2026.

The combination of elevated prices and steady deliveries has raised the possibility that Zimbabwe could surpass its record gold export earnings of US$4.61 billion achieved in 2025.

While bullion prices remain the biggest contributor to the increase in export values, sustaining production growth will determine whether the current rally translates into a prolonged period of stronger foreign currency generation.

The impact extends beyond export receipts. Higher gold earnings could boost government revenues through mineral royalties and taxes, while improving foreign currency availability for imports and industrial activity.

The gains also carry significance for Zimbabwe’s monetary framework. Gold forms part of the reserve assets backing the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) currency, meaning stronger official deliveries and export receipts could provide additional support for reserve accumulation.

With global gold prices remaining elevated and production levels holding firm, the precious metal is emerging as a key driver of Zimbabwe’s external sector performance in 2026.

At a gold price of US$4,500 per ounce for the year, as forecast by JPMorgan, Zimbabwe’s targeted 50-tonne annual production level would represent a gross metal value of about US$7.2 billion before royalties, refining charges and other production costs.

Small-Scale Lithium Miners Call for Inclusion in Zimbabwe’s Beneficiation Drive

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By Ryan Chigoche

Speaking exclusively to Mining Zimbabwe, artisanal and small-scale lithium miners who operate in the lithium-rich areas of Goromonzi and Mberengwa are calling for shared processing facilities, government-backed partnerships and guaranteed market access, arguing that beneficiation should create opportunities for local producers rather than exclude them.

Zimbabwe banned the export of raw lithium ore and later extended restrictions to lithium concentrates as part of a broader strategy to encourage domestic value addition. The policy has triggered significant investment in processing infrastructure, with major producers committing hundreds of millions of dollars to lithium sulphate plants designed to capture greater value from the country’s mineral resources.

The strategy reflects a broader ambition to transform Zimbabwe from a supplier of raw minerals into a producer of higher-value battery materials. For large mining companies with access to capital, the policy has accelerated investment in downstream processing.

For many small-scale miners, however, the transition has been far more difficult. For miners like Ashley Zvenhamo and Dean Kadango, who operate lithium claims in Goromonzi, the challenge is not a lack of mineral resources but a lack of access to the infrastructure needed to comply with Zimbabwe’s new lithium policy.

“Since the ban on lithium concentrate exports, the ability to sell lithium ore has changed significantly for small-scale miners,” Kadango said.

“Before the restrictions, it was easier to access buyers who were exporting directly, but now the market has become more difficult and unpredictable. Most opportunities now seem to favour larger companies that already have processing capacity.”

“At the moment, I do not have my own beneficiation or processing plant,” Kadango said. “Setting up a processing plant requires significant capital investment, reliable electricity, water supply and proper infrastructure, which is difficult for small operators to afford.”

Echoing the same sentiments, Zvenhamo, a small-scale miner in Mberengwa, told Mining Zimbabwe:

“We are being pushed out; we don’t have the capacity to beneficiate,” he said.

Without processing facilities, many small-scale producers say they have seen traditional buyers disappear, leaving stockpiles of ore with few legal market opportunities.

Their proposals focus on inclusion rather than reversing government policy.

Kadango believes shared processing facilities or toll-treatment arrangements could enable smaller producers to participate in beneficiation without individually investing hundreds of millions of dollars.

“For small miners, survival may depend on the establishment of shared processing facilities, partnerships or government support that allows us to participate in local beneficiation,” he said.

Zvenhamo argues that processing companies should also source part of their feedstock from registered local producers.

“I suggest our government must ask those with lithium plants to buy ore from local people,” he said.

Such arrangements are used in some mining jurisdictions through supply agreements, processing partnerships or incentives that encourage downstream companies to source material from compliant small-scale operators.

The debate comes as Zimbabwe’s lithium industry undergoes rapid structural change. Increasingly, production is shifting toward vertically integrated companies that mine, process and export higher-value lithium products, raising questions about how artisanal and small-scale miners can participate in the next phase of the industry’s development.

At the same time, authorities continue to tighten oversight of the sector.

In June 2026, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority uncovered a syndicate that allegedly used a cloned export permit to smuggle 204 tonnes of lithium ore through Forbes Border Post. Authorities said only part of the shipment was intercepted, highlighting the continued challenge of illegal mineral exports despite tighter regulations.

The smuggling case has reinforced the importance of building a transparent and well-regulated lithium industry. While authorities have not linked the case to the small-scale miners interviewed for this story, it illustrates the broader pressures facing a sector that is rapidly evolving under Zimbabwe’s beneficiation policy.

The challenge for policymakers is therefore twofold: maintaining the momentum behind downstream investment while ensuring that compliant small-scale miners are not permanently excluded from the country’s lithium value chain.

Zimbabwe’s beneficiation strategy has already begun reshaping one of Africa’s fastest-growing lithium industries. The question now is whether that transformation can also create space for the thousands of Zimbabweans whose livelihoods depend on small-scale mining.

For miners such as Zvenhamo and Kadango, the answer lies not in reversing beneficiation but in finding practical ways to participate in it.

Their message is straightforward: if beneficiation is to become the foundation of Zimbabwe’s lithium future, it should also create a pathway for local small-scale miners to become part of that future rather than spectators to it.

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 8 July 2026

Gold buying prices in Zimbabwe per gram/ ounce, 8 July 2026, from the official gold buyer and exporter, Fidelity Gold Refinery (FGR).

1 oz = 31.1035 g

CategoryPrice (US$/g)Price (US$/oz)
SG 90% and Above124.363,868.83
SG 85% but Less Than 90%123.053,828.08
SG 80% but Less Than 85%121.733,787.02
SG 75% but Less Than 80%120.413,745.95
Sample (5–10 g)118.443,684.68
Fire Assay (Cash)125.023,889.36

 

Note: The Fire Assay cash price applies to gold above 100g, with no sample deduction.

A sample of not more than 10g is deducted for the Fire Assay Transfer price.


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Mnangagwa Orders Immediate RHA Tungsten Mine Restart as Prices Hit Record Highs

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Premier African Minerals Ltd. (AIM: PREM) said Tuesday it has received formal written confirmation from the Zimbabwean government regarding the transfer of state-held shares in RHA Tungsten Private Ltd., resolving a long-standing ownership deadlock that has stalled the asset’s commercial revival, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Rudairo Mapuranga

President Emmerson Mnangagwa approved the reallocation of the government’s 51% stake, previously held by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce through the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF), to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development under the stewardship of the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC). The London-listed developer holds the remaining 49% and acts as the project’s operator.

Decade-Long Impasse Broken

The ownership structure has been a persistent obstacle since a 2019 agreement in which NIEEF committed US$6 million in funding to restore production, a pledge the government ultimately failed to honour. Premier had previously flagged the equity arrangement as a deterrent to further capital injection, with former CEO George Roach noting in 2023 that the company was unwilling to commit more funds under the existing terms. At one point, Premier even considered relocating most of RHA’s plant equipment to its Zulu lithium project.

The presidential directive instructs ZMDC to “urgently engage” with Premier to address outstanding operational, legal and capital matters, mandating that all necessary steps to effect the transfer commence without delay.

“This removes a key area of uncertainty and provides a clearer basis for Premier to progress commercial discussions on the future of RHA Tungsten,” Managing Director Graham Hill said in the statement.

Tungsten Prices at Historic Highs

The breakthrough arrives amid a historic supply shock in the global tungsten market, triggered by China’s export curbs introduced in early 2025. APT (ammonium paratungstate) prices have surged to approximately US$3,000 per metric ton unit in ex-China spot markets, compared to a five-year average of roughly US$300. Domestic Chinese tungsten concentrate prices jumped 221% year to date, climbing from RMB142,000/ton to RMB456,000/ton.

Analysts project a global tungsten supply deficit of 23,000 to 25,000 metric tons annually through 2029. BMO Capital Markets expects tightness to persist through 2026, with markets facing another shortfall.

ZMDC Involvement Accelerates Prospects

ZMDC’s entry as the state shareholder is viewed as a catalyst for project advancement. The RHA project, located in Zimbabwe’s Kamativi tin belt, holds SAMREC-compliant inferred resources of 1.093 million tonnes at 8.7 kg/t WO₃ and indicated resources of 147,000 tonnes at 4.7 kg/t WO₃. Historical production between 1931 and 1979 yielded 1,247 tonnes of wolframite concentrate at 65% WO₃.

Hill noted that the current price environment and initial transaction interest make the timing “timely”. Premier remains committed to constructive engagement with ZMDC to advance any deal capable of delivering value through its RHA holding, while simultaneously progressing its primary Zulu lithium-tantalum project towards spodumene concentrate production.

With ownership uncertainty removed and tungsten trading at record levels, the restart of RHA Tungsten is poised to accelerate significantly.

Dispute Resolution in the Mining Space: The Legal Strategy that Keeps Miners Out Of Court (and keeps them mining)

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  • A Lawyer’s practical guide to resolving mining conflicts before they destroy your business

The mining industry is never short of drama, to put it lightly. As of today, the 6th of July 2026, gold is selling at a price of USD125 000 [One Hundred and Twenty Five Thousand United States dollars] per kilogram. This is an unbelievably high-stakes industry. Only if it is done right. And only if disputes, which will occur anyway, are solved correctly and timeously.

It was a Tuesday morning when the call came through. A gold miner, let us call him Makova, was in a panic. His mining partner had locked him out of the operation. Security guards, hired by the partner, were preventing Makova from accessing the shaft. The equipment he had purchased sat idle. The ore they had blasted over the past months was being processed without his knowledge or consent. The ore, worth an estimated USD10 000 000 [Ten million United States dollars] would be life-changing for Makova, but evidently, all this would now come to nought.

“I want them arrested,” Makova said, his voice tight with anger. “I want a court order today. I want my mine back.”

I asked him a simple question: “How long do you think that will take?”

He paused. “A few weeks?”

I took a breath and delivered the hard truth: “Try two to five years and while you are waiting for the High Court to hear your case, your partner will be extracting your ore, your equipment will rust, and your investors will disappear.” Makova’s face fell. He had assumed the law would move quickly. He was wrong and that misunderstanding nearly cost him everything. Over sixteen years of legal practice, I have learned that the miners who survive disputes are not the ones who rush to court. They are the ones who understand that the courtroom is a last resort, not a first response. They are the ones who have a strategic dispute resolution plan in place before the conflict erupts. This article is about that strategy. It is about how to fight for your rights without sacrificing your mine.

Why litigation is a Miner’s nightmare

Let me be blunt, the High Court is not designed for mining disputes. It is designed for justice, which is a different thing entirely. When you file a case in the High Court, you are entering a legal minefield. The aura of the courtroom itself is intimidating and intense. Judges are mostly overwhelmed. Cases are postponed. Some court processes take time to mature and ultimately be heard. Your opponent’s lawyers will file every conceivable motion to delay. If the case is complex, and mining cases always are, you might wait eighteen months just to get a trial date. You may win at trial, but, if your opponent appeals, add another two to three years.

Meanwhile, what happens to your mine? It sits idle. Your equipment depreciates. Your investors lose confidence. Your employees find other work. The geological window for extraction might close. The market price for your commodity might collapse. Annual returns must be filed without fail lest you face a monster called forfeiture. By the time the court finally rules in your favour, the victory is hollow. If you are one of the few unlucky ones, your mine will be invaded by a few illegal miners, who will turn into an environmental hazard within the shortest possible time, thereby inviting the full wrath of the Environmental Management Agency [EMA].

I represented a miner once who was locked out of his claim by a former partner. We filed an urgent application for a spoliation order (a court order to restore possession). The application was granted within two weeks, a victory. However, by the time the full dispute was resolved in court, two years had passed. The miner had lost production, lost investors, and lost the momentum of the project. He won the legal battle but lost the mining war. The court cannot give you back those two years. It cannot restore your operational momentum. It cannot recover the capital you burned paying lawyers while your mine sat idle. This is why the smartest miners I know treat court as a weapon of last resort, not a first response.

What are your strategic options for dispute resolution?

Disputes under the Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05] in Zimbabwe are primarily resolved through a hierarchy of administrative reviews, specialised tribunals, and civil litigation, depending on the nature and complexity of the conflict.

The main mechanisms for resolving disputes include:

  1. Provincial Mining Directors (PMDs)

Formerly known as Mining Commissioners, the PMDs serve as the primary point of contact for local disputes (e.g., boundary conflicts, claim pegging, and miner-landholder disagreements). The PMD investigates the issue and makes an administrative determination, often mandating a cessation of mining operations if the situation requires it.

  1. Appeals to the Minister

If either party is dissatisfied with the PMD’s determination, they can appeal directly to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development. The Minister has the authority to review the case and confirm, vary, or overturn the PMD’s decision.

  1. Civil Litigation and the High Court

The Act gives the High Court original jurisdiction over most civil disputes, including claim ownership and breach of contract. Parties can approach the courts directly for interdicts (such as halting illegal or disputed mining) or if the nature of the dispute falls outside the PMD’s statutory mandate.

  1. Arbitration

For commercial or contractual mining disputes (such as Tribute Agreements), parties may opt for private arbitration. This is governed by the Arbitration Act [Chapter 7:15] and provides a binding resolution process.

  1. Mining Affairs Board

Handles disputes around the granting, withdrawal, or cancellation of mining titles and certain land use agreements.

Options I would recommend as the most practical

While boundary and title disputes belong to the Provincial Mining Director, commercial conflicts, such as Tribute Agreements, joint venture breakdowns, or shareholder deadlocks, require a completely different battleground. For these, private commercial arbitration is your business’s ultimate shield.

Option 1: Negotiation and direct settlement

This is the fastest, cheapest, and most effective dispute resolution mechanism. It is also the one most miners skip because they are too angry to think straight. When a dispute arises, your first move should be to sit down with the other party. Not in a confrontational way, but as a business problem to be solved. Often, disputes arise from miscommunication, not malice. A direct conversation, sometimes facilitated by a neutral third party, can resolve the issue in days. The key is to approach negotiation strategically. Before you meet, define your walk-away position. What is the absolute minimum you will accept? What are you willing to give up? What is non-negotiable? If you go into negotiation without clarity on these points, you will either capitulate or deadlock.

I had a client in a dispute over royalty payments with a custom milling operator. The miner believed the operator was underpaying; the operator claimed the miner was overestimating production. Rather than litigate, we arranged a meeting with both parties and an independent metallurgist. The metallurgist reviewed the production data, clarified the discrepancy (a simple accounting error), and the dispute was resolved in one day. The cost: a few hours of my time and the metallurgist’s fee. The alternative: two years in court.

Option 2: Mediation, when Negotiation stalls

If direct negotiation fails, mediation is the next logical step. A mediator is a neutral professional who facilitates a structured conversation between the parties. The mediator does not impose a decision; they help the parties find their own solution. Mediation is remarkably effective in mining disputes because it allows both parties to vent their grievances, be heard, and then focus on solving the problem. Many disputes have an emotional component; a feeling of betrayal or disrespect that must be acknowledged before a rational solution can emerge. In Zimbabwe, mediation is governed by common law principles and is increasingly recognised as a professional service. The process typically works like this: each party meets with the mediator separately to explain their position. The mediator then shuttles between the parties, identifying common ground and exploring potential solutions. If both parties agree on a solution, the mediator drafts a settlement agreement.

Mediation is confidential, which means nothing said in mediation can be used against you in court if the process fails. This confidentiality is crucial, it allows parties to be candid and creative without fear of legal consequences.

Option 3: Arbitration, the Miner’s secret weapon

This is where the real power lies. Arbitration is a private, binding process where the parties present their case to an arbitrator (or a panel of Arbitrators) rather than a Judge. The Arbitrator makes a final decision, which is binding and extremely difficult to appeal.

For miners, arbitration is transformative. Here is why:

  1. Speed

Arbitration typically takes six to twelve months from start to finish. The parties control the schedule. There is no court congestion. No postponements because the judge is busy with other cases. You set the timeline, and the arbitrator works within it.

  1. Expertise

In arbitration, you can select an arbitrator who understands metallurgy, mining finance, and the realities of extraction. You are not wasting time educating the decision-maker on how a mine works.

  1. Confidentiality

Court proceedings are public. Your proprietary geological data, your financial records, your production figures, all become public record. In arbitration, everything is private. What is discussed stays confidential. This protects your competitive advantage and your investor relationships.

  1. Finality

Once an arbitral award is issued, it is final. Under Zimbabwe’s Arbitration Act, the High Court will only overturn an award on very narrow grounds, essentially, if the arbitrator violated public policy or acted with gross misconduct. This finality is powerful. You get a decision, and you move on. No endless appeals.

  1. Enforceability

Zimbabwe is a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. This means an arbitral award issued in Zimbabwe can be enforced in virtually any country in the world. If your opponent has assets abroad, you can pursue them. This is far more powerful than a court judgment, which may not be recognized internationally.

How to build a Dispute Resolution plan before you need it

The miners who survive disputes are the ones who plan for them before they happen. Here is a practical roadmap:

Step 1: Draft a tiered Dispute Resolution clause in every Contract

Every mining agreement, whether it is a joint venture agreement, a partnership agreement, a supply contract, or an equipment lease, must contain a dispute resolution clause. This clause should specify a tiered approach. If a dispute arises, the parties will attempt to resolve it through direct negotiation within 30 days. If negotiation fails, the parties will submit to mediation for a further 30 days. If mediation fails, the dispute will be submitted to binding arbitration in Harare under the rules of the Commercial Arbitration Centre. By inserting this clause, you are not anticipating failure; you are engineering a process that keeps disputes private, swift, and manageable.

Step 2: Choose your Arbitrator in advance [provided the other party mutually agrees]

Some sophisticated mining companies identify potential Arbitrators before they are needed. They research arbitrators with mining experience, check their track records, and even have preliminary conversations. When a dispute arises, they already know who they want to arbitrate it. This sounds excessive, but it is not. It saves time and ensures you have an Arbitrator you trust.

Step 3: Document everything

The best defense in any dispute is clear documentation. Every agreement should be in writing. Every significant conversation should be followed by an email confirming what was discussed. Every payment should be documented. Every production figure should be recorded. When a dispute arises and you go to Arbitration, the Arbitrator will want to see the documentary evidence. If you have it, you are in a strong position. If you do not, you are vulnerable.

Step 4: Preserve evidence

If a dispute erupts, your first instinct might be to retaliate. Resist that instinct. Instead, preserve evidence. Take photographs. Record production figures. Preserve emails and WhatsApp messages. Document any breaches or violations. This evidence will be crucial if the dispute goes to arbitration and because arbitration is confidential, you can present sensitive evidence without fear of public exposure.

Step 5: Act quickly, but strategically

If a dispute arises, do not delay. Contact a lawyer immediately. But do not rush to court. Instead, work with your lawyer to develop a dispute resolution strategy. Should you attempt negotiation first? Is mediation appropriate? Should you go straight to arbitration? The right strategy depends on the specific dispute, the relationship with the other party, and your business objectives. A good lawyer will help you navigate these choices.

In conclusion

As a lawyer, I have seen disputes destroy mining operations that had excellent geology, solid capital and experienced management. The difference between those that survived and those that did not was not the strength of their legal case, it was their dispute resolution strategy.

Here is what I tell every miner I advise:

The first thing is to build dispute resolution clauses into every contract you sign. Make Arbitration your default mechanism for resolving disputes. Secondly, when a dispute arises, resist the urge to rush to court. Instead, follow a tiered approach: negotiate first, mediate second, arbitrate third. The court should be your last resort. Thirdly, choose your Arbitrator carefully. Invest in someone with mining experience who understands the realities of your operation. Fourth, document everything. Your documentary evidence is your best defence. Last but not least, act quickly, but strategically. Get legal advice immediately, but do not let anger drive your decisions.

The miners who thrive are not the ones who win the most legal battles. They are the ones who avoid legal battles altogether by resolving disputes swiftly, privately, and strategically. They keep their mines operating, their investors confident, and their focus on extraction rather than litigation.

Your next dispute is coming. It is not a question of if, but when. The question is: will you be ready?


About the Author:

Namatirai Ruzvidzo is a registered Legal Practitioner, Conveyancer and Notary Public. She possesses over 15 years of experience specialising in Commercial law, Mining law and Property law. She practices in Avondale, Harare, under the Law Firm, Ruzvidzo Legal Counsel. She can be reached on +263 784 228 534 or email [email protected], copying [email protected]

Caledonia Warns Gold Boom Is Pulling Zimbabwean Children from Classrooms into Mines

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Caledonia Mining Corporation has warned that soaring gold prices are drawing school-age children into Zimbabwe’s informal mining sector, as the lure of quick earnings pulls young people out of classrooms and into hazardous work, Mining Zimbabwe can report.

By Ryan Chigoche

The Victoria Falls-listed gold producer, which operates Blanket Mine in Gwanda, said in its latest sustainability report that unregulated artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) poses significant safety, environmental, legal and supply chain risks, adding that elevated gold prices have made informal mining “increasingly attractive, including for youth.”

The warning comes as gold continues its historic rally. The World Gold Council reported that the precious metal reached fresh record highs in 2025, with quarterly average prices exceeding US$4,000 per ounce, strengthening incentives for informal mining in Zimbabwe and other gold-producing countries.

However, behind Zimbabwe’s record gold prices lies a growing social cost. In mining communities, the promise of quick earnings is increasingly pulling children out of classrooms and into dangerous informal mining operations, raising concerns that the country’s gold boom is being accompanied by a silent education crisis.

As a solution, Caledonia said it supports stronger regulation and the formalisation of artisanal mining as a way to reduce the risks associated with informal operations. The company stressed that it does not operate, finance or purchase gold from artisanal miners, adding that illegal mining remains closely linked to unsafe working conditions and the involvement of school-age children.

These concerns reflect a wider global pattern. In its 2025 Global Estimates of Child Labour report, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNICEF estimated that 138 million children were engaged in child labour in 2024, including 54 million in hazardous work. The agencies warned that poverty, weak social protection and limited access to quality education continue to push children into dangerous sectors, with Sub-Saharan Africa remaining the most affected region.

Zimbabwe is no exception. A 2023 ILO report estimated that thousands of Zimbabwean children are engaged in hazardous work in artisanal mining, although comprehensive national data remains limited.

The US Embassy in Harare has similarly reported that economic hardship has contributed to rising child labour in artisanal mining, with girls as young as 12 being exploited through sex trafficking in gold mining communities in Mashonaland East, Mazowe, Bindura and Shurugwi.

Zimbabwean law sets the minimum age for employment at 16 and prohibits anyone under 18 from undertaking hazardous work. However, weak enforcement, limited inspection capacity and persistent poverty continue to push vulnerable families towards informal mining.

With gold prices expected to remain elevated, the challenge for policymakers is becoming increasingly urgent. While formalising the ASM sector may improve oversight and safety, the powerful economic pull of record gold prices continues to undermine school attendance and expose children to hazardous work, highlighting the need for stronger enforcement, stronger social protection and greater investment in education to keep children out of the pits and in the classroom.